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ADJUSTING ALIENABILITY
Lee Anne Fennell*
In recent years, the right to exclude has dominated property theory, relegating
alienability another of the standard incidents of ownership to the scholarly
shadows. Law and economics has also long neglected inalienability,despite its inclusion
in Calabresi and Melamed's Cathedral. In this Article, I explore inalienability rules as
tools for achieving efficiency or other ends when applied to resources that society
generally views as appropriate objects of market transactions. Specifically, I focus on
inalienability'scapacity to alter upstream decisions by would-be resellers about whether
to acquire an entitlement in the first place. By influencing these acquisition decisions,
inalienability rules can buttress or substitute for other adjustments to the property
bundle in addressing resource dilemmas. Of particular interest is the possibility that
limits on alienability could sidestep the holdout problems that have often spurred resort
to liability rules, and could do so without interfering as profoundly with the owner's
autonomy interests. While alienability limits carry well-known disadvantages, they
might be structured in ways that would minimize those drawbacks. Recognizing the full
potential of alienability limits in addressing resource dilemmas requires applying the
same level of creativity to devising inalienability rules as has previously been applied to
the design of liability rules.

Inalienability stood alongside property rules and liability rules in
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's celebrated HarvardLaw Review article,' but law and economics scholars have never considered it
an equal partner in the triad.2 Unlike property rules and liability

* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments and conversations on earlier drafts, I thank Scott Anderson, Ian Ayres, Ben Barros, Omri Ben-Shahar, Anupam Chander, Nestor Davidson, Chris Drahozal, Chris Fennell, Brett Fischmann, Bernard Harcourt, Paul Heald, Herb Hovenkamp, Larissa Katz, Dan Kelly, Gregg Kettles, Jim Krier, George
Lefcoe, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Randy Picker, Daria Roithmayr, Carol
Rose, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Adam Samaha, Lior Strahilevitz, Stephanie Stern, Madhavi Sunder,
and Steve Yelderman. I am also grateful for feedback from students in Lior Strahilevitz's Autumn 2008 Property Theory Seminar, as well as the comments and questions of participants in a
2o08 Law and Society panel, the 20o8 Property Works in Progress conference, and workshops at
the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Iowa College of Law, the University of
Kansas School of Law, and the University of Southern California School of Law. I thank the Bernard G. Sang Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for financial support. Catherine Kiwala and Eric Singer provided excellent research assistance. All errors are inalienably
mine.
I Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. io89 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985) ("Inalienability is the stepchild of law and economics."); Matteo
Rizzolli, The Cathedral: An Economic Survey of Legal Remedies §§ 2.3.3-2.4 (Feb. 13, 2oo8) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=io92I44 (noting that inalienability
rules play a limited role in the economic analysis of remedies). Some notable treatments of inalienability incorporating economic analysis include Rose-Ackerman, supra; Ian Ayres & Kristin
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
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rules, workhorse concepts that permeate every corner of the economic
analysis of law, inalienability enters economic discussions mostly as an
anomaly, and usually in the company of an entitlement whose suitability for market transfer is hotly contested. A similar pattern can be
seen in property theory, where the right to exclude 3 has almost entirely
eclipsed any sustained consideration of alienability. 4 This neglect is
odd. Not only is alienability one of the standard incidents of ownership 5 but limits on an owner's right to exclude sometimes seem to be
directly prompted by anxiety about alienability - the specter of one
party strategically acquiring a good only to resell it to a higher-valuing
party.6 Concern about such strategic acquisition for resale surfaces in
a variety of contexts, from blackmail to cybersquatting to ticket scalping to water speculation. Yet the connections between these concerns
and alienability as an attribute of property remain largely unexplored.
Of course, alienability has not been edged out of legal scholarship
entirely. Scholarly debate continues apace about whether particular
things, such as human organs or legal rights, should be bought and
sold on the open market.' Here, questions of personhood, autonomy,

45 (gg9); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (I985); and
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, io8 YALE L.J. 1163, 1198-1202 (1999).

3 For a recent discussion of, and contribution to, the large body of property scholarship focused on exclusion, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'VY 593 (2oo8).
4 This shortfall in the literature is not met by the assertion that alienability has no independent significance for property theory, but rather only represents one facet of exclusion. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 742-43 (1998) (arguing
that exclusion encompasses all attributes of property, including alienability). Notwithstanding
this expansive claim, property theory's explorations of exclusion have given little attention to
alienability.
5 Alienability has been associated with both the right to the wealth represented by an asset
and the ability to transmit the asset to another. See TONY HONOR9, Ownership, in MAKING
LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161, 170-71 (1987) (discussing the "right to

the capital"); id. at 171-73 (discussing "transmissibility").
6 See, e.g., I5 U.S.C. § 1s25(d)(i)(B)(i)(VI) (2006) (listing the offer to sell a domain name that
has not been used as a factor that may indicate bad faith); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern about injunctions "employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees" to would-be licensees); infra section I.B (discussing these and other examples).
7 Hundreds of articles and books have addressed the sale of human tissue. See, e.g., Michele
Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV.
305 (2004). The sale of parental rights has also been the subject of extensive debate, much of it
provoked by Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). Recent work on the sale of legal rights and claims includes, for example, Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Daniel
A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2oo6); Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A Comment on Daniel
Farber's "Another View of the Quagmire," 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953 (2oo6); and Saul Levmore,
Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV III (2ooo). See also Claire Priest, Creating an American

Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, i2o HARV L. REV. 385 (2oo6)
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paternalism, and the downstream personal and societal consequences
of allowing or blocking transfers take center stage. 8 The prominence
of this undeniably interesting set of questions has, I suggest, unduly
cabined our thinking about alienability. Legal theorists tend to assume
that alienability limits are suited only for special realms involving intensely personal or otherwise highly charged entitlements and are of
little or no relevance to the ordinary run of property interests.
In this Article, I explore a less-studied side of inalienability rules:
their potential as tools for achieving efficiency (or other ends) when
applied to resources that society generally views as appropriate objects
of market transactions. Specifically, I focus on inalienability's capacity
to alter upstream decisions by would-be resellers about whether to acquire an entitlement in the first place. By influencing these acquisition
decisions, inalienability rules can buttress or substitute for other adjustments to the property bundle in addressing resource dilemmas.
Earlier work, including a 1985 article by Susan Rose-Ackerman and a
response piece by Richard Epstein, has already established inalienability's traction as a "second-best" method for achieving goals that cannot
be cost-effectively pursued through limits on acquisition or use alone. 9
For example, alienability limits can reduce pressure on common pool

(addressing alienability in the context of historical protections against creditors); Jedediah Purdy,
A Freedom-PromotingApproach to Property:A Renewed Traditionfor New Debates, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1237, 1246-48 (2oo5) (discussing the "anticommodification critique" of expansions in
property).
8 A key catalyst for work in this area is Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, ioo
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]. See also MARGARET
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUS-

TICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100-03 (983)

(cataloguing blocked ex-

changes); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i, at I111-15 (discussing rationales for inalienability).
9 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 933 (arguing that "inalienability rules can be second-best
responses to various kinds of market failures"); Epstein, supra note 2, at 970 (explaining that restraints on alienation can "provide indirect control over external harms when direct means of control are ineffective to the task"); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 268, 273 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
("Inalienability is frequently useful, not as an ideal policy, but as a second-best response to the
messiness and complexity of the world.").
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resources,' 0 elicit investments in public goods," and simplify enforcement. 12 This Article builds on that analysis in three ways.
First, I examine how inalienability rules might, through ex ante effects on acquisition incentives, reduce the incidence of costly holdout
or hold-up problems.1 3 Most discussions of holdout dynamics have focused on the choice between property rules and liability rules; debate
typically centers on whether an owner's refusal to transfer an entitlement that is highly valued by another party is sufficiently problematic
to justify overriding her veto.' 4 Counterintuitively, however, concerns
about an owner's veto power can be addressed not only by making
transfers easier (as through liability rules) but also by making transfers
harder (as through alienability restrictions). The former approach cuts
through holdout problems in a familiar (and familiarly problematic)
way, while the latter alternative encourages the self-selection of owners
who are likely to be relatively high-valuing users over the long run."
While inalienability's relevance to holdout problems has been noted
previously, 16 the idea that inalienability rules might substitute for liability rules in a variety of contexts remains underappreciated.

10

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 978-82; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943; see also

Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 813, 870 (2003) (explaining that inalienability can protect "over-consumed resources," because "without market value, the pressure for exploiting such resources dissipates");
Carol M. Rose, From HO to CO,: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 5o ARIZ. L. REV.
91, 95 (2oo8) (noting the potential for trade, which "opens up a resource to everyone in the world,"
to "put[] too much pressure on the resource").
11 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 957-58 (discussing the purposes of inalienability
in the Homesteading Acts).
12 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 973-78 (giving examples involving guns, alcohol, drugs,
and violence-promoting information).
13 The term "holdout" is usually associated with multi-party bargaining situations, such as
those common in land assembly contexts, while "hold-up" is more frequently used in the context
of two-party instances of bilateral monopoly. Both situations exhibit the same basic strategic dynamic; therefore, I will refer to them both as "holdout" problems here. See infra section II.C (discussing holdout problems).
14 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i,at io92, 1107 (defining liability rules and explaining how they can overcome holdout problems); infra section H.C.
15 See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2,at 54 (explaining how inalienability could induce plain-

tiffs to reveal whether they value an injunction for its own sake or merely as leverage). One of
my students, Steve Yelderman, also raised the possibility that alienability limits on injunctions to
enforce patents could induce self-sorting by patent holders into different remedial regimes. The
potential for alienability restrictions to induce self-selection in the service of distributive goals is
explored in Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2,at 940. As Rose-Ackerman explains: "If policymakers
wish to benefit a particular sort of person but cannot easily identify those people ex ante, they
may be able to impose restrictions on the entitlement that are less onerous for the worthy group
than for others who are nominally eligible." Id.
16 Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, examines how inalienable injunctions might respond to strategic remedial choices designed to "hold up" the defendant. Michael Heller has examined how
bans on fragmentation (that is, prohibitions on alienating particular configurations) might be explained by a desire to reduce downstream holdout problems. Heller, supra note 2,at 1176-82.
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The Article's second contribution comprises a broader examination
of the substitutability and complementarity of different mechanisms
for addressing resource tragedies. The idea that inalienability can fill
in for or backstop other controls on property has not gone unrecognized, 7 but the full implications of this point have yet to be traced.
Here, I examine alternative means for addressing strategic dilemmas
- whether the overharvesting or undercultivation problems associated
with commons tragedies, or the coordination and holdout problems
that are the hallmarks of anticommons tragedies.18 Doing so sheds
new light on the interdependent relationship among limits on acquisition, use, alienability, and exclusion.
Third, the Article examines the conditions under which alienability
limits offer a more promising point of intervention than limits on acquisition, use, or exclusion. In comparing alternatives, it is essential to
recognize that alienability is not a binary switch to be turned on or off,
but rather a dimension of property ownership that can be adjusted in
many different ways. While any restriction on alienability carries the
potential to inefficiently block the flow of goods to higher-valuing users, carefully designed inalienability rules might have minimal "blocking costs" in certain settings while offering other advantages. In addition to being more easily administrable in some contexts, inalienability
rules can sidestep information asymmetries by inducing the selfselection of those who highly value the entitlement. 19 Perhaps most
important, alienability limits do not force sales and hence have different implications for autonomy than do liability rules. Thus, they are
of particular interest in settings where bargaining dilemmas have
reached such a magnitude that some intervention into the ownership
bundle is indicated.
Significantly, inalienability rules can be consciously designed to minimize the extent to which they lock up resources in suboptimal uses.
For example, put options can be combined with alienability limits to
avoid tying up resources in the hands of parties who, over time, become low valuers.2 0 Requiring the use of devices like second-price
17 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 99o ("In essence the restraint on alienation is a substitute
for direct remedies for misuse when these are costly and uncertain to administer."); Dean Lueck,
The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, i8 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 318-19 (1989).

18 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 1-22 (2008) [hereinafter HELLER,

GRIDLOCK] (describing the tragedy of the anticommons as a problem of "gridlock"); Lee Anne
Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 926-3o (2004) (discussing the connection between holdout problems and the anticommons tragedy). For an extended discussion of
anticommons tragedies, see generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, iii HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Heller,
Anticommons].
19 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 939, 945-48; infra section Ill.B.2.
20 See infra section m.C.i.
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auctions can alter incentives to strategically acquire goods that hold
significant value for only one party without blocking alienability altogether.2 1 Alienability limits can also be fine-tuned to achieve other social goals. For example, limits on alienability can remove intermediate
alternatives and force parties to make "all or nothing" choices that
may be desirable from standpoints of efficiency or distributive
22
justice.
The analysis proceeds in three Parts that roughly correspond to the
three contributions just described. Part I uses the anxiety surrounding
certain kinds of transfers as a springboard for exploring the relationship between strategic dilemmas and alienability. Part II builds on
those lessons to present inalienability as a mechanism for managing resource tragedies. Part III works through a menu of adjustments to
alienability rights and compares the performance of alienability restrictions with interventions at other possible chokepoints.
Before beginning, a clarification about the scope of the project is in
order. My approach to inalienability rules in this Article is purely analytic: I seek to examine their potential as tools by showing how they
work, how they differ from other approaches, where they might fall
short, and how they might be honed to serve desired ends better. I do
not grapple with larger questions surrounding the alienability of any
specific entitlement or develop an overarching normative theory about
alienability. Nor do I tout inalienability as the only or best answer to
any particular problem or set of problems. My goal is more modest: to
get inalienability rules out of the "special purpose" box to which they
have been relegated and to convince readers to view them as viable instruments for addressing ubiquitous, costly dilemmas. Along the way,
I hope to foster a broader rethinking of alienability's place in property
theory.
I. ANXIETY AND ALIENABILITY

Proposed transfers may make people uneasy for any number of reasons. Many of these reasons have been extensively treated elsewhere,
and I will not attempt to recount them all here. Instead, I want to isolate a specific, underappreciated source of concern - that the free
alienability of a good, otherwise comfortably the subject of commerce,
will prompt wasteful ex ante decisions about acquisition or use that
contribute to costly resource dilemmas. Some initial taxonomic work

21 See infra section mH.C.2.
22 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration
in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 668 (2oo8) (explaining how the invalidation of a condi-

tion on a grant puts the donor to a choice between withholding the grant altogether or making it
free of the condition); infra section HI.A. 3 .
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in section A will mark out this area of interest conceptually, and the
examples and analysis in sections B and C, respectively, will flesh it
out further.
A. Extrinsic Concerns, Ex Ante Effects
23
Two dichotomies are especially relevant to this Article's project.

First, we can distinguish between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" objections
to a good's transfer. Intrinsic objections identify features of a particular good that make it a poor candidate for transfer or for market allocation in general. For example, writers opposing the sale of parental
rights, human organs, or legal rights often allege harms intrinsic to the
transfer of these items, whether framed as an affront to the personhood of the parties involved, a degrading of the entitlement itself, or a
coarsening of the sensibilities of society as a whole.2 4 Extrinsic concerns about alienability, in contrast, are not based on any inherent
problem with the transfer of the entitlement in question or with its allocation by the market; the focus is instead on alienability's contribution, within a given structural and institutional context, to social or
economic problems that are not part and parcel of the transfer itself.
By this definition, extrinsic objections could always be addressed
through means other than alienability restrictions, although perhaps
25
less efficiently.
Notably, both intrinsic and extrinsic objections might be raised
about the transfer of the same good. For example, organ sales might
be opposed both out of fear that the transfer would compromise some

23 Existing treatments have broken down justifications for alienability restrictions in a variety
of other ways. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i, at 1111-15 (discussing how efficiency and distributive goals might be advanced through inalienability rules); Epstein, supra note

at 970 (distinguishing between inalienability rules targeting "the practical control of externalities" and those aimed at "asserted distributional weakness"); Hsu, supra note io,at 870 (listing
2,

three categories of goals served by alienability and inalienability); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2,

at 932-33 (identifying "[t]hree broad rationales" for restrictions: those based on "economic efficiency itself," those directed at "certain specialized distributive goals," and those necessary to safeguard "the responsible functioning of a democratic state"); W. Stephen Westermann, A Theory of
Autonomy Entitlements: One View of the Cathedral Nave Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and
Other Individual Liberties 8-9 & n.Ig (Apr. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=977964 (listing eight reasons that limits on alienability might be
adopted).
24 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV 1293, 1387-9o (984) (discussing structural justifications for making
rights nonwaivable); Radin, Market-Inalienability,supra note 8, at 1879-86 (discussing potential
negative effects of commodification on personhood and on the "texture of the human world"
(quoting HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 14I (1981)).
25 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2,at 938 (discussing inalienability as a response to market
failure in instances where "straightforward responses" like internalizing externalities are unavailable or unduly costly).
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element of personhood 6 and out of fear that an open market in organs
would lead to violence aimed at the involuntary harvesting of organs.27 The latter justification is extrinsic to the sale of the good itself;
it turns on whether restrictions on transfers are more effective at controlling the feared violence than alternative approaches, such as
heightened enforcement of criminal laws. 8 Two primary strands of
Richard Titmuss's famous argument about the effects of markets in
blood 9 also illustrate how intrinsic and extrinsic arguments may become intertwined. Part of Titmuss's thesis focuses on the potential for
commercial blood markets to introduce lower-quality blood into the
system, given the "conflict of interests" that blood sellers (but not altruistic blood donors) have with respect to private information that bears
on blood quality.30 This is an extrinsic objection to alienability, given
that blood quality might be addressed in other ways.31 A second and
logically independent strand of Titmuss's argument, however, posits
that the existence of the paid market in blood will actually drive donors out of the system. 3 2 Here, the objection is an intrinsic one - that
merely by making blood marketable, its meaning is altered in ways
that keep it from being perceived as a meaningful gift. Because this
transformation does not occur for ordinary goods (books and sweaters
do not become inappropriate gifts merely because they are also sold),
the argument must turn on some special characteristic of the good in
33
question that makes its sale problematic.
Alienability concerns can also be divided temporally into ex ante
("upstream") and ex post ("downstream") objections. Think of a proposed transfer from A to B situated in the middle of a timeline. One
set of reasons for blocking the transfer relates to what will happen following that transfer. Perhaps A will regret it or will suffer unantici26 See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability,supra note 8, at 1915-17 & n.239.
27 See, e.g., Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in i HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 183, 248 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (citing DAVID D.
FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH THE LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS 242 (2OOO)).

28 Restrictions on transfers are one way of making illegal activity less profitable - a wellrecognized approach to violations that are hard to detect. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
549-53 (2ooi) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the "dry-up-the-market" justification for
making conduct illegal, where doing so makes difficult-to-police violations less profitable).
29 RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL

POLICY (1971). Debate surrounding Titmuss's work on blood has been extensive. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, IPHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
2, at 945-48; Emanuel D. Thorne, When Private PartsAre Made Public Goods: The Economics of
Market-Inalienability,I5 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1998).
30 See TITMUSS, supra note 29, at 240-46.
31 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 946.
32 TITMUSS, supra note 29, at 223.

33 The same argument might, of course, be made with respect to other goods whose sale is
challenged on intrinsic grounds - organs, sexual services, reproductive services, and so on.
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pated (or myopically underrated) consequences. Maybe B will misuse
the entitlement or transfer it to others who will do so. The entitlement
itself may suffer for having been the subject of a transfer. Broader
consequences may also ensue. Perhaps the socially constructed meaning of the entitlement will erode. Or perhaps a society in which more
Bs and fewer As hold the entitlement will be impoverished culturally
or compromised distributively or morally. Thus, ex post effects may
involve the person who parts with her endowment, the person who
acquires it, the endowment itself, or society at large; they may be
couched in terms that are consequentialist or deontological; the effects
34
may occur immediately or take a long time to manifest.
A different set of reasons for blocking the A to B transfer would be
to alter the upstream course of events by influencing whether and how
parties initially acquire and use the entitlement. This, too, will have
downstream consequences - indeed, that is the very point. But inalienability's role in producing those consequences operates through an
indirect mechanism. The value added by the A to B blockade comes
not from blocking the A to B transfer itself, but by inducing better preblockade decisions. 3S Seeing a blockade ahead will influence A's decision to acquire the entitlement. Sometimes, these ex ante effects relate
closely to features intrinsic to the good. For example, Titmuss's argument that markets in blood would alter incentives to engage in altruistic donation amounts to an upstream effect on individual "harvesting"
choices that seems to turn on something intrinsic to the good in question. 36 Often, however, ex ante rationales for inalienability are tied to
extrinsic considerations such as efficiency or distributive fairness,
37
which might also be pursued in other ways.
34 These effects would encompass not just individual interests in the entitlement but also what
have been termed "structural" or "instrumental" justifications for the inalienability of particular
endowments. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 497, 498 & n.125 (1991) (discussing "structural" arguments for the inalienability of constitutional rights that relate to effects
on society, governance, or third parties); Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323,
1335-36 (2000) (discussing "non-instrumentalist" and "instrumentalist" rationales for making votes
inalienable and identifying the latter with Cass Sunstein's argument that the alienability of votes
would change the meaning of voting (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation
in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 849 (199))).
35 A corollary of this point is that the blockade may appear inefficient when viewed ex post.
See infra section IH.B.
36 See TITMUSS, supra note 29, at 223.
37 Supply effects that are straightforwardly produced by market forces might be objectionable
because of an entitlement's special characteristics. For example, babies or donor organs might be
produced in larger quantities or in different output patterns as a result of market forces - results
that might be viewed as fundamentally at odds with the meaning of parental rights or organ donation. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel & Frances H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1987). At least in theory, these supply effects could be
addressed by means other than inalienability (for example, production quotas), making the con-
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Similarly, ex post and intrinsic concerns share an affinity in the literature, even though they are not conceptually coterminous. Concerns
about the intrinsic wrongness of transferring certain items feed naturally (although not exclusively) into concerns about the ex post effects
the transfer itself will have on the parties, on the entitlement, and on
society. Because ex post effects are often context-specific in just the
way that intrinsic rationales demand, the two are frequently (although
not inevitably3 8 ) paired. Together, intrinsic and ex post arguments
make up the bulk of scholarship about inalienability. This Article, in
contrast, focuses on a different and often overlooked subset of alienability concerns: the area defined by the overlap of extrinsic and ex ante
concerns. Thus, I focus on inalienability's impact on ex ante incentives to acquire and use goods that are not deemed intrinsically unsuited for market transfer. To get an intuitive sense of this category, it
is helpful to consider a few examples of goods that I will call "anxiously alienable."
B. Anxiously Alienable Goods
The following nonexhaustive list offers some concrete examples of
anxiously alienable goods. Although these goods are generally accepted as appropriate articles of commerce, 39 their transfer ignites concern under certain conditions due to feared ex ante incentive effects on
acquisition or use. That concern, interestingly, does not always translate into restrictions on alienability; thus, the legal treatment of the
items on the list varies. Each of these examples has received extensive
treatment by other authors, which I do not attempt to summarize here;
my brief descriptions are instead designed to point to commonalities
(and some differences) among the cases.
i. Patents. Patent holders may license their patents to others
rather than develop marketable goods and services themselves. While
this power to license is not usually deemed problematic, some patent
holders who seek licensing arrangements are tagged as "trolls. '40 Alcern "extrinsic" in my schema. Similarly, the concern that people would engage in violence or oppression to harvest organs or produce babies is also "extrinsic" in that these acts could, in theory,
be controlled independent of alienability restraints. See supra p. 1411. However, features intrinsic to the entitlements at issue contribute to the horrific nature of these acts.
38 For example, Michael Heller's discussion of legal rules against entitlement fragmentation
(an extrinsically based inalienability rule) focuses on the ex post effect of these rules on future
marketability. See Heller, supra note 2, at 1176-82.
39 I do not mean to suggest that there could never be an intrinsic argument relating to the
alienability of the goods on this list. See, e.g., Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their
Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood,
81 CAL. L. REV 595 (1993) (discussing a personhood argument against preinvention agreements
that assign patent rights to the employer).
40 The term has been attributed to Peter Detkin, who coined it in 2001 when he was a lawyer
at Intel. HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 218 n.34. According to Detkin, patent trolls "try
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though definitions vary, concerns focus on entities that strategically
acquire a patent for the express purpose of later licensing it (that is,
with no plan to practice it), then lie in wait as other business entities
develop products or services of which the patented material is an integral part. 41 Once reliance on the patented element has reached a very
high level, the troll emerges and threatens a devastating shutdown
42
through injunctive relief unless a licensing agreement is negotiated.
The degree of monopoly power enjoyed by the patent holder is obvi43
ously great at this stage.
Concern over such "trolls" (although not denominated as such) was
evident in Justice Kennedy's concurrence 44 in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,45 a case holding that a four-factor test rather than an
automatic presumption determines whether a patent holder is entitled
to injunctive relief. On remand, the district court declined to grant an
injunction, finding that "MercExchange has utilized its patents as a
sword to extract money rather than as a shield to protect its right to
exclude or its market-share, reputation, goodwill, or name recogni-

to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced." Alan Murray, War on "PatentTrolls" May Be Wrong Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2006, at A2, quoted in HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 218
n.3441 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2oo8-1o (2007); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting

Process, ACADEMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL BULLETIN (Progress & Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.), May 20o6, at 4, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ip/bulletins/bulletinI.3patent.pdf.
Firms are typically described as trolls only when they do not make any products of their own;
firms that make products may also hold patent rights essential to others, but their strategic posturing is constrained by their own need to use components patented by others. See HELLER,
GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 59 (noting that the system of "mutual[ly] assured destruction" that
constrains "equally balanced competitors" does not deter patent trolls).
42 See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2oo8-1o. A patent holder's threatened shutdown of BlackBerry email service is often cited as an example of the "patent troll" pattern. See,
e.g., id. at 2008-09. The shutdown was averted by a $612.5 million settlement reached shortly
before a judge was expected to issue an injunction. See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service To Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 20o6, at Ci.
43 Although all patents grant a limited monopoly, the degree of leverage this confers against
another party depends on questions of both remedies and substitutes. As the infringer moves further along the path to production, viable substitutes dwindle; the company, through its investments, becomes increasingly committed to one manner of proceeding. See Lichtman, supra note
41, at 2. By analogy, all land is unique and hence each landowner holds a monopoly over a specific location, but this only produces significant monopoly power in fairly limited circumstances
- as where the land is uniquely well-suited to some particular purpose, or is part of a larger assembly, as for a railroad or highway. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75-76 (1986).
44 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also Balganesh, supra note 3, at 655; John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007).
45 126 S. Ct. 1837.
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tion. '' 46 The ability to use things that one owns "to extract money" is

of course the essence of alienability.
2. Domain Names. - A practice known as "cybersquatting" developed from the acquisition structure for internet domain names.47 Cybersquatters are those who strategically acquire domain names closely
associated with well-known companies or individuals and then attempt to resell the names to those companies or individuals for a
profit.48

Congress responded with the I999 Anticybersquatting Con-

sumer Protection Act 49 (ACPA), which provides remedies against domain name owners found to have "a bad faith intent to profit from" a
protected mark. 50 ACPA's multifactor test for bad faith includes (but
51
is not limited to) nine enumerated factors, subject to a safe harbor.
For example, the domain registrant's own intellectual property rights
in the name, the fact that the domain name is the registrant's own legal name or other commonly used name, and the fact that the domain
name had already been used by the registrant for bona fide purposes
would all weigh against a finding of bad faith.52 Factors suggesting an
intent to harm the owner of the protected mark or to extract money
46 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F Supp. 2d 556, 572 (E.D. Va. 2007).
47 The system of domain name registration allows website addresses to be claimed on a relatively unrestricted first-in-time basis. See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3 d
248, 252 (4 th Cir. 2002) ("A person seeking the right to use a particular domain name may register
with one of a number of registrar organizations that assign domain names on a first-come firstserved basis."); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 8I TEX. L. REV 715 (2003) (discussing and criticizing the "first-come, first-served" system of domain name rights). Federal statutes
place some limits on domain name registration and use, however. See infra notes 49-5o and accompanying text. A great deal has been written about cybersquatting and related phenomena;
some treatments that connect the topic to larger property theory and mechanism design questions
include Chander, supra; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 693-94; and Gideon Parchomovsky,
On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211.
48 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F 3 d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3 d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000).
49 Pub. L. No. IO6-i13, 113 Stat. 15oiA-545 (codified at i5 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)).
50 Id. § 3002, 113 Stat. at I5oiA-545 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § I 25(d)(i)(A)(i)); id. § 3003, 113
Stat. at 150iA-549 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d)); see also Virtual Works, 238 F.3 d at 267-68
(describing the statutory scheme). Rules promulgated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) as part of its dispute resolution policies also focus on bad faith.
See Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 213; ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm; see also
ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), http://www.icann.
org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. Further limits on domain name registration for those displaying materials that are obscene or "harmful to minors" are found in the Truth in Domain
Names Act of 2oo3, Pub. L. 108-21 I117 Stat. 686 (codified at i8 U.S.C. § 2252B (2oo6)). See generally Christopher G. Clark, Note, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2oo3 and a Preventative
Measure To Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (2004).
51 15 U.S.C. § 112 5 (d)(I)(B)(i)-(ii).
52 Id. § ii2 5 (d)(I)(B)(i)(I)-(IV); see also id. § 12 5 (d)(i)(B)(i)(IX) (including as a consideration
the extent to which the mark incorporated into the domain name fails to qualify as "distinctive
and famous").
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from the mark owner would weigh in the opposite direction. 53 In
an offer to sell the name is deemed indicative of
some circumstances,
54
bad faith.
3. Land Use Entitlements. - The possibility that injunctions will
be used to exert undue leverage, already mentioned in the patent context, emerges again in the realm of land use entitlements. 5 5 Consider
the case of Pile v. Pedrick,56 in which one party built a wall with
foundation stones that encroached trivially on the other party's property.5 7 Refusing damages, and further refusing to allow the other party
to file off the ends of the offending stones (which would have required
entry onto the plaintiff's land), the plaintiff insisted on an injunction
that would require complete destruction of the wall and the building
to which it was attached. Presumably, the motive for taking this extreme position was either spite or the desire to extract larger damages
58
than the law prescribed.
Courts may use liability rules to address such innocent encroachments. Either the encroacher is permitted to remain on the land by
paying fair market value for it, or (in the case of larger encroachments)
the landowner is entitled to the improvements if she pays fair market
value for them.5 9 Both approaches place the land and the improvement in the same hands without the need for mutual consent, and
hence avoid strategic posturing. However, courts may at times respond to such situations by granting injunctions that, if enforced,
would be inefficient. To deter parties from insisting on injunctions
solely to gain bargaining leverage, Ian Ayres and Kristen Madison
have proposed an alienability limit - a default rule specifying that the
plaintiff may not sell her injunction to the defendant - coupled with
53 See id. § 112 5 (d)(i)(B)(i)(V), (VI), (VIII); see also id. § 1125(d)(i)(B)(i)(VII) (regarding false or
inaccurate contact information).
54 Id. § I i2 5 (d)(i)(B)(i)(VI).
55 The empirical significance of this concern is unclear. Ward Farnsworth's examination of
twenty nuisance cases did not reveal any instances of post-judgment bargaining or any indication
that such bargaining would have occurred had the cases been decided differently. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases BargainAfter Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral,66
U. CHI. L. REV 373, 381-84 (1999).
56 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895).
57 Id. at 647.
58 See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 49-50 (analyzing Pile and the strategic potential of
the plaintiff's remedial choice).
59 See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 54-56, 67-77 (2007) (discussing these remedial approaches, which depart from the
common law's harsh injunctive treatment of even the most minimal and innocent encroachments).
Although these forms of relief represent the modern trend, their availability varies by jurisdiction
and is restricted in various ways. See id. at 54-56, 76; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 135 (6th ed. 2oo6) (noting "[t]he modern tendency ... to ease the plight of innocent
improvers"). For additional discussion, see Matteo Rizzolli, Building Encroachments (Dec. 2,
2oo8) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 310256.
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procedures that would allow the defendant to voluntarily increase the
amount of damages that will be awarded. 60 This procedure would put
the plaintiff to a forced, final choice between damages (as augmented
by the defendant) and
an injunction that cannot be lifted in exchange
61
for compensation.
The bargaining dilemma that Ayres and Madison identify is not
limited to injunctions. Coase pointed out a converse problem with the
strategic exercise of land use rights that lie within an owner's discretion (and that are therefore not enjoinable):
A threatens to build a house which will spoil the view from, and block the
light to, B's house ....
A demands £i,ooo as the price of agreeing not to
build ....

Is this blackmail?

Suppose that A would not have built,

whether B made this payment or not, because the cost of building a house
on this site exceeded the price at which it could be sold. In these circumstances, the demand for £i,ooo could be regarded as blackmail or something akin to it. It is a payment to A for agreeing not to do something
62
which he has no interest in doing.

Many similar problems of the "pay me not to" or "pay me to stop" va63
riety can be readily imagined, from ugly structures to jarring noises.
4. Damaging Information. - Whether inadvertently or through
"digging," a party may acquire information about a person that, if disclosed, would be highly damaging to that person's reputation, career,
or relationships. It is perfectly legal to disclose that information oneself or to sell it to third parties, such as tabloids, who will disclose it.
It is also perfectly legal to keep the information to oneself. But offering to sell the suppression of the information to the person who would
be harmed by its disclosure is blackmail, a serious crime. This is
thought to present a puzzle or paradox. 64 Why is it a crime to offer a
60 Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 7 i-8i. The alienability limit would only bar plaintiff-todefendant sales; the winning plaintiff could sell her injunction to third parties if she wished. Id.
at 7 -72. The alienability limit would serve only as a default rule; the parties together or the defendant acting alone could opt for full alienability. Id. at 98-ioo.
61 Id. at ioo ("Inalienability and additur in effect give defendants the right to make a take-itor-leave-it offer.").
62 Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV 655, 670 (i988);
see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-85 (974) (presenting a similar
example in which a "neighbor has no desire to erect the [ugly] structure on the land; he formulates
his plan and informs you of it solely in order to sell you his abstention from it").
63 For a recent examination of such problems, see generally Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers (Dec. 13, 2oo8) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
64 The scholarly literature on blackmail is unusually rich. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG,

HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238-76 (i988); NOzICK, supra note 62, at 85-86; Mitchell N. Ber-

man, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REv 795
(1998); Coase, supra note 62, at 67i; Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553
(0983); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (984);
Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993). The text sets out the basic puzzle with
which most authors begin their analyses.
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person whose fate turns on the release or suppression of the information the chance to influence, through a monetary payment, which of
two (entirely legal) options one will pursue? Damaging information,
generally alienable, somehow becomes a forbidden item of commerce
when offered to the one person we might expect to be most interested
in what happens to it.
5. Water - In western states where water is scarce, a rule of prior
65
appropriation allocates rights based on diversion for beneficial use.
Water rights are transferable, subject to limitations, but buying rights
for speculative purposes is prohibited. 66 Typically, this prohibition is
enforced through beneficial use requirements that do not permit holding water for future use. 67 If one fails to make beneficial use of water
for a period of time, rights to it can be lost. 68 One may only transfer
rights in water that has been put to beneficial use, and the buyer must
continue with beneficial use in order to maintain the rights. 69 These
restrictions are apparently driven by concerns that speculative appropriators could monopolize the water supply, causing prices to spike
upward in a way that could threaten livelihoods and even lives.70
Other restrictions on transfers, such as requiring that the buyer and
seller be located in the same stream basin and make the same use of
the water, may be understood as responses to measurement difficulties
in allocating use rights. 7
In eastern states, where water has generally been more plentiful, a
riparian system bundles the rights in surface water with the ownership
of property abutting the water source, precluding the A la carte alienation of water rights.7 2 Reasonable use limitations, coupled with dis-

65 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at 34-35; see also Henry E. Smith, Govern-

ing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 5o ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 455 (2oo8) (noting

that "in many states, prior appropriation has acquired a regulatory overlay").
66 See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture:The Inefficient Searchfor
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. gig (j998); Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation
Doctrineand Its Implicationsfor Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 994 (2008).
67 See Neuman, supra note 66, at 964; Zellmer, supra note 66, at I004-o5. Speculation may be
expressly ruled out. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a) (2008) (defining "appropriation"
to exclude "the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights" to other parties). There are
a number of exceptions to this rule. See Zellmer, supra note 66, at 1012-22. For example, states
and local governments can hold water for future use. See Neuman, supra note 66, at 968; Zellmer, supra note 66, at 1013-16.
68 See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 655-56; John C. Peck & Constance Crittenden
Owen, Loss of Kansas Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 8oi (1995); Smith, supra
note 65, at 468; Zellmer, supra note 66, at ioo5 . For a discussion of the distinction between abandonment and forfeiture, see Peck & Owen, supra, at 820.
69 Zellmer, supra note 66, at 1012.
70
71

See, e.g., id. at 1007-08.
See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

1997); Lueck & Miceli, supra note 27, at 246-47.
72 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 979-82; Zellmer, supra note 66, at ioog.
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tinctions like those between "natural" and "artificial" uses, further prevent water from being extracted from the stream for resale.7 3 Although groundwater is handled through a separate regulatory system,
alienability may raise concerns in that context as well.7 4 For example,
a businessman's recent plan to withdraw 250,000 bottles of water each
day from an East Montpelier, Vermont spring has attracted opposition
from neighbors.7 5 Analogous concerns about excessive draws against a
common pool explain both the recently enacted Great Lakes Compact,
which largely prohibits diversion of water from the Great Lakes basin,7 6 and the continuing ire against the compact's "bottled-water
loophole.""

6. Scarce Seats. - Legal limits and social opprobrium often attach
to so-called "ticket scalpers," who buy tickets to popular events solely
for the purpose of reselling them later, at a higher price.7" Related
concerns surround the resale of access to other scarce goods, such as
preferred airline seats7 9 or tables at restaurants.8 0 In such cases, the
party offering the good or service has set the price below the marketclearing level,"' producing queuing and other manifestations of excess
demand. As a result, there are arbitrage opportunities for an intermediary. The fact that the underlying good is openly sold suggests that
the concerns about resale stem from the intermediation itself rather
than from a conviction that the good in question is intrinsically un82
suited for sale.
73 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 979-82; Smith, supra note 65, at 473.
74 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at 34 (discussing the historical and modern

treatment of groundwater).
75 Felicity Barringer, Bottling Plan Pushes Groundwater to Center Stage in Vermont, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2I, 2008, at AI4.

76 Susan Saulny, Congress Passes Great Lakes ProtectionBill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

24,

2008, at

A17.
77 See Kari Lydersen, Bottled Water at Issue in Great Lakes, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2008, at
A7 (discussing controversy over the compact's exception for water in containers with capacities of
less than 5.7 gallons).

78 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 64, at 231-38; see also infra pp. 1435-36.

79 See Ron Lieber & Susan Warren, Southwest Makes It HarderTo Jump the Line, WALL ST.
J., June 7, 2oo6, at Di.
80 See, e.g., Monica Eng & Christopher Borrelli, Your Table Is Ready - For a Price, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 8, 2oo8, at i (discussing the online service tablexchange.com, which sells reservations
to overbooked restaurants).
81 But see Pascal Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2003, at
85, 85 (questioning the hypothesis that underpricing is "the fundamental cause of secondary ticket
markets').
82 It is possible to quibble with this point. Consider a case that is a bit harder to classify the practice of law students attempting to buy their way into oversubscribed classes. See Martha
Neil, NYU Students Seek Coveted Law School Classes, Will Pay Cash, A.B.A. J., July 28, 2008,
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/nyu-students-seek_coveted-law-school-classes-will-paycash. Here, the underlying good (a legal education) is the subject of a market transaction, albeit
one in which only a limited number of people are invited to engage. Once one's tuition is paid
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C. Middlepeople and Monopolists
Nearly all of the cases above involve intermediaries or "middlepeople" who decide to acquire an entitlement solely because of its alienability. In the remaining examples (such as those involving land use
rights), alienability creates an incentive to use or enforce an existing
entitlement that would not otherwise be used or enforced. In many of
these cases, the incentive is enhanced by the chance of wielding significant monopoly power. If the entitlements in question were inalienable, certain acquisitions and threatened uses would drop out of the
picture. Foreseeing the inability to sell, those motivated solely by resale opportunities would simply select out of the market. Inalienability, then, could serve as a tool to change the mix of acquisition and use
decisions associated with a given entitlement.
Of course, the fact that inalienability could be used in this way
does not establish that it should be. The fact that strategic acquisition
for resale can produce anxiety does not dictate any particular response,
and one might well question whether restricting alienability could ever
be the right answer. Driving out transactions is usually a bad idea although consumers may dislike middlepeople for skimming away surplus, such intermediaries typically add value to the market as a whole
by lowering search costs, absorbing risk, thickening markets, and
spanning time and space to match up consumers with products and
services. 8 3 Notwithstanding the anxiety that "speculators" and other
intermediaries have produced throughout history,84 as a rule they appear to make markets work better.8 5 Is there anything about anxiously
alienable goods (or some subset of them) that might cast doubt on this
general principle?
One way to approach the question is to observe that some transactions (or threatened transactions) are so fraught with fairness or effiand one becomes a member of a law school community, however, access to different portions of
the educational experience may be rationed on nonmonetary bases for reasons intrinsic to the
meaning of the community and its collective endeavor. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 12o0-21.
83 See, e.g., DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 2 16-24 (1982).

84 See, e.g., id. at 216 (citing CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 38-39 (3d ed. 1996)); Lynn A. Stout, Why the
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48
DUKE L.J. 701, 712-34 (1999) (discussing legal limits on speculation and some possible rationales
for them).
85 In financial markets, speculative activity is credited with helping to generate more information and liquidity, among other benefits. For a discussion of these points in the context of the
SEC's recent ban on short-selling, see, for example, Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, End the Ban on Short-Selling, FORBES.COM, Oct. i, 2oo8, http://www.forbes.com/
2oo8/o9/3o/short-selling-ban-oped-cx-mb.iooibrenner.html.
The ban has since expired. See
Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, Short-Sale Ban Ends to Poor Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008,
at C 3 . For discussion of the benefits associated with land speculation, see, for example, Epstein,
supra note 2, at 989; and Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 694.
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ciency concerns that the question is not whether the law will become
involved, but how. If policymakers decide that a particular set of
transactions leads to unacceptably high bargaining costs or to other
normatively unacceptable outcomes, an intervention of some sort is inevitable - whether it takes the form of reviewing particular transactions and applying punishments if indicia of "bad faith" are found,
substituting liability rules for property rules, altering acquisition protocols, or something else. Because all of these possible responses will
cost something, it makes sense to compare the costs of inalienability
with those of the other alternatives. An examination of the potential
fairness and efficiency concerns implicated by anxiously alienable
goods indicates why the law might get involved and provides a preliminary sense of whether inalienability might offer a viable avenue for
that involvement.
i. Fairness Concerns. Perceptions of unfairness, perhaps augmented by cognitive biases, offer important explanations for the concern that attaches to anxiously alienable goods. In many settings involving inalienable entitlements, distributive concerns focus on protecting would-be sellers from exploitation by would-be buyers (think,
for example, of the sales of organs or votes), but concerns about exploitation run in the other direction in the case of anxiously alienable
goods. Here, sympathies lie with the would-be buyer, while the
would-be seller is regarded with suspicion. Three factors seem especially important in this connection.
First, people may perceive unfairness whenever the owner of a
good has sufficient leverage to raise prices above competitive or accustomed levels. For example, one study found that 82% of respondents
viewed it as either "unfair" or "very unfair" for a merchant to raise the
price of snow shovels after a snowstorm.8 6 The snowstorm may be severe enough to give a merchant a temporary geographic monopoly if people cannot move their cars without buying a shovel, they can
only buy from a store within walking distance - and the leveraging of
this market power may be viewed as unfairly exploiting a vulnerability. On the other hand, the potential for such a price boost may have
created the incentive for the merchant to stock the shovels in the first
place, allowing them to take up floor space and overhead during the
many non-snowy days preceding the storm. 87 Moreover, the higher

86 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness As a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (I986), cited and discussed in
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 89-go 0993).
87 Discussion of these points recently resurfaced surrounding preparations for Tropical
Storm Fay. See, e.g., Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1219175029.shtml (Aug. ig, 2oo8, 15:43) (quoting Posting of Glen Whitman to Agoraphilia, http://
agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2oo3/oo/in-defense-of-gouging.html (Sept. 23, 2oo8, 15:58)).
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price arguably does a better job than queues or mob scenes at efficiently moving the newly scarce resources to their highest-valuing users.88 Yet perceptions of unfairness remain, perhaps because of the
tendency to focus on the price at which the shovels were available before the storm. 89 Similar effects may generate distaste for ticket scalpers or reservation merchants.
Second, and closely related, equity concerns are likely to be heightened when the good in question is necessary to forestall a loss. Losses,
of course, are a function of baselines, and hence a matter of framing. 90
However, some goods, like water, are so essential to life that going
without them would be unambiguously viewed as a loss by everyone. 9 1
Likewise, the inability to control an entitlement that is tightly associated with one's identity (even if someone else is the legal owner) could
threaten especially painful losses - a factor that could be relevant for
some anxiously alienable goods, such as domain names or damaging
information. 92 Even the lowly snow shovel is necessary to keep people
from experiencing a loss relative to ordinary days - being snowbound. 93 Similar losses are easy to see in the building of an ugly structure, the enforcement of an injunction that will disrupt a going concern, and so on.
Third, the resale of entitlements that are not allocated through
market processes or that are initially sold below the market-clearing
price may contribute to a perception of unfairness. A review of the list
above reveals that anxiously alienable goods tend to fit this description. If the initial allocation of the good did not screen for high valuation, it is likely both that the initial holder of the entitlement will not
be its highest valuer and that a large amount of surplus will result
from moving the entitlement into the hands of that high valuer. To allow an intermediary who initially acquires and then resells the enti-

88 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 86, at 89 (noting that in this scenario, "the price mechanism

is being invoked to ration goods in temporary short-supply among an excess of demanders").
89 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 86, at 729-31 (discussing the role of "reference
transactions" in fairness evaluations).
90 See id. at 731-32.

91 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 64, at 232 (distinguishing ticket scalping from charging a
high price for water to a person dying of thirst); TREBILCOCK, supra note 86, at 84-1o (distinguishing situations based on whether they pose a threat to life).
92 I thank Daria Roithmayr for comments on this point. For an extended examination of the
distributive implications of domain name policy, see generally Chander, supra note 47.
93 Alternatively, the price increase for the shovel might be the loss in the story. If prices had
been at "storm levels" all along (even with very frequent "sales"), the reaction would likely be
much different. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 86, at 732 (finding that 71% of
survey respondents viewed as unfair a car dealer's $2oo price increase in response to the shortage
of a popular car model, while only 42% thought it unfair for a dealer who had previously offered
a $200 "discount" for the car to revert to the car's list price in these circumstances).
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tlement to claim a significant
share of this surplus may seem to grant
94
her an unearned windfall.
Sometimes, however, the seller acquired the good through some
past effort, as in the case of patents, or on the basis of some value
added, such as contributing liquidity or special knowledge. Here, the
picture is less clear, even from a purely distributive perspective. We
might wish to reward creative work and other useful efforts by granting control over at least some portion of the surplus that results. But
what if part of the surplus on the table is generated not by those efforts alone but by an idiosyncratically vulnerable position that another
party comes to occupy? An analogous question arises with respect to a
landowner's right to a share of the surplus that comes from combining
her property with that of others, where that surplus comes not from
anything that the landowner has done but rather from a larger project
95
conceived by someone else.
These fairness points may seem too cognitively malleable or normatively indeterminate to offer much help in understanding, much less
addressing, anxiety about alienability. But inalienability's capacity to
filter out particular transactions (and transactors), if otherwise justified
on efficiency grounds, could have the side benefit of reducing unfairness perceptions - and potentially doing so in a manner that is less
costly than other possible policy reactions.
2. Inefficiencies. A paradigmatic source of inefficiency is the
costly wrangling associated with bilateral monopoly.96 Land use disputes between neighbors, blackmail, and some of the other scenarios
discussed above introduce exactly this concern - the good, offered by
a single seller, has an idiosyncratically high value for a single buyer
while remaining worthless, or very nearly so, to everyone else. The
risk of bargaining impasse or wasteful negotiation is quite high in such
cases, especially when the surplus at issue is very large. Significantly,
the efficiency analysis is indifferent to how the available surplus gets
distributed between the parties, except insofar as distribution feeds
back into ex ante incentives to engage in productive activities or affects the efficiency of the bargaining process itself. 97 The fear is not
that one party will "take advantage" of another or get more surplus
than she "deserves," but rather that worthwhile deals will fail alto94 But see Eric Kades, Windfalls, io8 YALE L.J. 1489, 1505-10 (r9g) (arguing that what appears to be a "windfall" is often the result of planning and effort). In these cases, the initial
amount paid may serve as a "reference transaction" that influences the evaluation of the resale's
fairness. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 86, at 729-31.
95 See Merrill, supra note 43, at 86.
96 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Monsanto Lecture: ProtectingProperty with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
793, 802-o4 (1998) (describing bilateral monopoly bargaining problems).
97 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV 1075, 1077-78 (ig8o).
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gether, or will happen only after much value is dissipated through
costly strategic interactions.
Such bargaining concerns have received a great deal of attention in
the literature comparing property rules and liability rules. 98 In many
instances, society may view the costs of wrangling and the risk of impasse as the price it must pay to maintain a system that gives parties
appropriate incentives to create unique things of value, to acquire and
use special skills, and so on. But suppose we could be certain that the
acquisition or use that created the bilateral monopoly added no social
value. In that case, the wrangling associated with the resulting bargaining games would produce only a loss. 9 9 A mechanism for filtering
out these kinds of transactions - worthless intermediations that introduce bargaining dilemmas without any countervailing social benefits
would seem welcome from an efficiency standpoint.
Scholars analyzing phenomena like blackmail and cybersquatting
have correctly homed in on the worthlessness of the underlying acquisition activity. 10 0 But worthlessness is a slippery benchmark; as Russell Hardin notes, all of us do lots of things that fail to generate any
social product. 10 1 For the most part, however, people internalize the
costs of doing (apparently) pointless things, which provides a strong
incentive not to engage in them unless their consumption value or
some hidden benefit for others makes them worth their opportunity
costs. Thus, the market generally drives out truly worthless intermediation. But if the meddler can leverage her worthless intervention
into significant monopoly power, her ability to offload costs onto a
hapless victim keeps the essential worthlessness of the intervention
from operating as a check. That same monopoly leverage then gives
rise to high bargaining costs. In such cases, inducing parties to select
out of the marketplace through alienability limits might avoid costly
bargaining problems relatively cheaply; although some transactions

98 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i, at hbo6-o7; Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View
of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, io6 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093-94 (997).
99 Cf. Coase, supra note 62, at 671 ("It is obviously undesirable that resources should be devoted to bargaining which produces a situation no better than it was previously.").
10 See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 62, at 84-85 (contrasting a case in which a neighbor has a
legitimate desire to build a "monstrosity," where paying him not to do so "will be a productive
exchange," with the unproductive exchange that would follow if the neighbor came up with the
building plan "solely in order to sell you his abstention from it"); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul
Shechtman, Blackmail. An Economic Analysis of the Law, 14I U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 186o (i993)
("No rational economic planner would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to digging
up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it."); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 694
(distinguishing cybersquatting from land speculation on the grounds that the former "is a socially
wasteful activity"). But see Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV 1905,
1919-21 (1993) (questioning whether the bargaining in blackmail situations can fairly be classified
as unproductive, given the realignment of property rights it potentially produces).
101 Russell Hardin, Blackmailingfor Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REV 1787, i8o6 (993).
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would be blocked, those are transactions that would have added no
value.
How well do our problem cases above align with this model? Buying domain names for resale seems to line up reasonably well, assuming (as seems true) that the intermediary's involvement plays no role in
sustaining or funding the system for making domain names available.
Damaging information fits well up to a point, but then hits a snag.
Sometimes the information that is uncovered holds market value,
keeping the intermediary's involvement from being completely useless. 10 2 The model arguably fits even less comfortably with patent acquisition; monopoly power may exist, but as long as "trolls" add some
value, there is not the kind of worthless meddling that the pattern
specifies.' 0 3 Of course, it is not necessary that transactions be utterly
valueless in order for filtering them out to be the best thing, on balance. The question depends not only on the value of the transactions,
but also on the costs of the bargaining situations they create and the
costs of alternative ways of addressing those bargaining situations.
Bringing inalienability explicitly into the picture permits just such a
comparison. It may also be possible, as discussed below, to adjust
alienability in ways that selectively flush out relatively worthless intermediations while leaving incentives unchanged for relatively valu04

able ones. 1

Land use presents a somewhat different picture than the other scenarios, in that parties are faulted for threatening to use or enforce an
existing right, rather than for newly acquiring an entitlement for leverage purposes.10 5 Although it is often assumed that a landowner's
threatened use or enforcement of a right that holds no positive value
for her is a social waste, this might not always be true.'0 6 For example, a landowner's threat to build an ugly structure or a tall fence
might convey information to her neighbor about the extent of their re102 See infra pp. 146o-61 (discussing "market-price" blackmail).

In the case of incriminating

information, it might be argued that the intermediation of blackmailers serves an additional purpose - private deterrence - although countervailing factors may make blackmail socially costly
on net. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail As Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. i935
('993).

103 For arguments discussing the value added by trolls, see, for example, James F. McDonough

III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2oo6).

104 See infra section III.C.2.
105 We might think of an injunction as an entitlement that might be intentionally acquired for
leverage purposes. But if strong exclusion rights are part of what the landowner holds, the injunction arguably involves only the enforcement of an existing entitlement rather than the acqui-

sition of a new one.
106 See Isenbergh, supra note ioo, at 1919-23; id. at 1920 (observing that land use bargains that
appear to leave things unchanged may actually result in a useful realignment of property rights

"beneath the surface").
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spective entitlement bundles. This new knowledge is not completely
worthless if it leads the neighbor to consider bargaining to a different
rights allocation. Such a bargain could lead to a new servitude on the
threatening owner's land that would prevent a future owner, who
might genuinely wish to build some unsightly structure, from carrying
out that plan. 10 7 More broadly, the possibility of such threats may lead
to useful societal arrangements - such as reciprocal covenants that
restrain each landowner from undertaking actions like the building of
ugly fences.10 8 Still, it is worth asking whether the improvement in
rights definition that flows from the builder's threat carries a large
enough social benefit to justify the resulting bargaining costs.
The last two examples in the list -

water and scarce seats -

di-

verge from the pattern in other ways. Water speculators and ticket
scalpers do not (at least typically) introduce the prospect of bilateral
monopoly.109 There are multiple units of the good in question, multiple potential buyers, and likely multiple sellers as well; the prospect of
two parties wastefully vying over a large amount of surplus seems remote, and the worthlessness of the intermediation is at least open to
question. Nonetheless, if one party were to gain a monopoly position
over the resource, we would expect the usual deadweight loss to follow: some customers who would have been willing to pay the competitive price no longer purchase the good. 110
A different sort of problem arises when the party who is willing to
pay the most for the entitlement presents a threat to a common pool
resource or public good. Again, ex ante effects might justify an inalienability rule - here, because of its capacity to induce self-selection
by those who will be good stewards or contributors. For example,
people who are willing to engage in a given acquisition protocol, such
as standing in a line for tickets or farming the land for a number of
years, might also happen to be good contributors to a public good
(such as audience enthusiasm or the successful settlement of the West).
If so, prohibiting resale will be necessary to make that self-selection
work.I 11
107 See id. at 1920-23.
108 However, to the extent these new rights allocations are hard to alter, new problems may be
presented. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 829, 846-

5I.

109 Scenarios like the one in which a person dying of thirst encounters the only water source

within reach would be exceptions. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 250 (1986) (discussing

this example, posed in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV.
79, 88-89 (i981)).

110 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-Line Differential Pricing, 71
GEO. L.J. 1157, 1162-64 (1983).

III For discussion of and sources for these examples, see infra notes 155-158 and accompanying
text (ticket queues) and notes 228-229 and accompanying text (homestead settlement).
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Similarly, erasing the prospect of resales would reduce the incentive
to "stockpile" entitlements in an effort to command monopoly power.
Because the viability of some common pool resources depends on faith
that others will not threaten the good's continued availability through
stockpiling, getting stockpilers to self-select out of the commons could
have important effects. 1 2 At a more basic level, commoners who are
drawing against common pool resources only for their own use, rather
than for resale, will make more modest draws. 1 13 This analysis has
obvious relevance to rights in water and other natural resources, and is
best taken up in the next Part's examination of alienability restrictions
as potential responses to the strategic dilemmas associated with the
commons and the anticommons.
II. INALIENABILITY As TRAGEDY MANAGEMENT
In this Part, I will examine more broadly the role that alienability
limits could play in managing collective action problems surrounding
resources. My goal at this stage is not to argue that inalienability rules
are superior to other interventions; often, they are not." 4 Rather, I
hope to show how adjustments to alienability can serve as complements to and substitutes for other adjustments to the property bundle,
such as the use of liability rules in place of property rules. The examples discussed in this section thus show how inalienability could play a
role in increasing the available surplus within various collective settings, whether private or public. Of course, it is an entirely separate
question, not reached here, whether the government should expend resources to facilitate the realization of that surplus, especially in instances where it will redound to the benefit of a small group or private
entity rather than to the public at large."'
First, a definitional point: While inalienability can be construed
quite broadly to include any restriction that has either the purpose or
effect of making transfers more difficult or unlikely, 1 6 it is helpful to
distinguish legal constraints on the transfer of property ("alienability
limits" or "inalienability rules")" 7 from other conditions, restrictions, or
features that limit, as a practical matter, the seller's prospects for

112 See infra p. '43'.
113 See infra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.

114 Later, I take up the question of when inalienability rules might be preferred. See infra Part
Ill.
11s I thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for comments on this point.
116 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 931 ("Inalienability can be defined as any restric-

tion on the transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement.").
117 These constraints might either be imposed by law or formulated by private entities in a

manner that is legally enforceable.
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alienating the property (limits affecting "marketability"). 18 The former category includes not only outright bans on transfers, but also
transfer taxes or fees, procedures that must be completed prior to sale,
criteria that transferors or transferees must meet (such as age restrictions or minimum holding periods), limits on the permissible price
range, requirements that items be sold as a bundle (or separately), 119
limits on the times at which transfers may occur, and so on. 120 In the
latter category we might place servitudes attaching to real or personal
property that restrict its use, or particular entitlement configurations,
such as single square inches of land, 121 that are unattractive to most
buyers.

118 See

Heller, supra note

2, at 1200

(distinguishing alienability from marketability in a slightly

different manner); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 474 (1984) (distinguishing

"[f]ree alienability," which in his lexicon "means that a landowner can in disposing of his lands
impose whatever conditions he wishes, for as long as he wishes," from "[f]ree marketability," the
idea "that interests in land should be readily saleable"). The distinction tracks one that has been
made in property law between restraints on the alienation of a fee simple absolute and restraints
on land use that hinder the owner's ability to alienate the property. See, e.g., Mountain Brow
Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818-i9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (distinguishing restrictions on the alienability of a fee simple, which are generally invalid,
from restraints on use, which are often valid).
119 Requiring the sale of certain minimum bundles corresponds to "antifragmentation" rules
that are often associated with preserving marketability. See Heller, supra note 2, at i 176-82. The
converse requirement that items be sold only separately, rather than built into larger transactions,
has been explored in the context of rights and liberties in Westermann, supra note 23, at 18-19
(discussing "anti-bundling inalienability rule[s]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120 It is possible to combine these conditions in various ways. For example, the tax code contains some provisions that link the tax due on the realization of a gain to the holding period of the
asset. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 84, at 733-34; Internal Revenue Service, Tax Facts about Capital Gains and Losses, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/o,,id=io6799,oo.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2oog). This approach effectively prices alienability within different holding periods. I thank
Jonathan Nash for this point. Similarly, some affordable housing programs phase in the amount
of equity that a departing owner is entitled to receive based on the holding period, again pricing
rather than prohibiting alienability. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable
Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527,
545-47(2007).
121 See Heller, Anticommons, supra note I8, at 682-84 (discussing Quaker Oats's 1955 "Big
Inch" promotional giveaway in which millions of deeds to square inches of land in the Yukon
were packaged in cereal boxes); see also HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 6-8 & fig.i.2.
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Legal rules can affect either dimension or both at the same time. 122
Both are of course relevant to whether a transfer actually occurs. 123
Recognizing this, some scholars have emphasized the ability of certain
alienability restrictions, like those requiring that property be sold 1in
24
certain minimum bundles, to preserve downstream marketability.
But alienability limits can also have important upstream impacts on
incentives to acquire and use entitlements.
A. Overharvesting
Limits on alienability can respond indirectly to concerns about inefficient draws on a common pool resource. 2 5 For example, a ban on
the sale of eagle feathers may be instrumental in enforcing a prohibition on killing eagles; its overbreadth in blocking the sale of eagle parts
taken before the ban went into effect may be justified by difficulties in
distinguishing feathers acquired before the ban from those acquired afterwards.126 An alienability restriction can have important effects on
122 For example, suppose certain categories of people are legally disabled from receiving or
owning a good. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 935-36. The result is a legally mandated
thinning of the market which might be classified both as an alienability restriction and as an impediment to marketability. In general, we would expect limits on alienability to reduce marketability. For example, a minimum holding period makes an entitlement harder to transfer both
because of the restriction itself (one must wait for the minimum period to elapse before a transfer
can be made) and because of the restriction's effect on the desirability of the bundle (some prospective buyers will be put off by the holding period). Similarly, taxes on transfers reduce the
surplus available for the parties to a transaction and thus make fewer such transactions worthwhile. In some cases, however, alienability limits are put in place in an effort to preserve long-run
marketability. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
123 The impact that both elements have on transfers has led some authors to refer to them both
as facets of alienability. See, e.g., Rose, supra note io, at 1o5 (in discussing cap-and-trade programs, noting that "efforts to improve the precision of property rights limit their alienability").
Drawing a distinction between them, however, facilitates viewing them as potential substitutes for
each other. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV 607, 637-38 & fig.4 (2ooo) (distinguishing between, and noting the
substitutability of, ex ante narrowing of the "currency" to be used in environmental trading programs and ex post limits on the trades themselves).
124 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 118, at 474 (explaining how the exercise of "[f]ree alienability" might restrict marketability); Heller, supra note 2, at 1176-82 (discussing a number of legal
doctrines that might serve the purpose of limiting fragmentation of interests to preserve future
marketability); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 1O2 YALE L.J. I315, 1374 (1993)
(discussing legal rules that "deter destructive decompositions of property interests"); Frank I.
Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 1s-i6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (observing that
property law "abounds in restrictions on decomposition of titles" that may serve "efficiency
goals").
125 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2,at 978-88; Lueck, supra note 17, at 318-19; Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 2, at 942-43.
126 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 944-45 (discussing and critiquing Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 5I (979), in which such a ban on sales was upheld against a takings challenge);
see also Heller, supra note 2, at 1211-12 (discussing Andrus); Hsu, supra note io, at 870 (noting
the role of the alienability limits contained in the Endangered Species Act).
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harvesting levels even if the ban on acquisition is nonexistent or woefully underenforced. The reason is straightforward: the incentive to
harvest is magnified if a thick resale market exists for harvested
goods.'2 7 Without this heightened incentive in place, harvesters will
likely turn their attention to other ways of making a living. 2 8 Alienability limits may also help to reinforce selective acquisition rules, at
least to the extent that permitted categories of harvesting involve personal acquisition by the end user. 12 9 For example, under certain circumstances Native Americans can obtain a permit to take an eagle in
order to use its tail feathers in a religious ceremony. 130 Alienability restrictions can help ensure that the eagles killed pursuant to the permits
are in fact used in the specified ways.
Inside a limited-access commons, an alienability restriction can
stand in for other kinds of governance rules.13 ' The fact that a limited-access commons excludes everyone except for the approved commoners already makes possible a wider range of formal and informal
solutions to collective action problems than could be sustained in an
open-access arrangement. 3 2 Nonetheless, some mechanism is necessary to prevent uncooperative behavior within the commons, and rules
restricting alienability represent one possibility. For example, if a lim127 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 347, 351-52 (1967) (stating that the development of the fur trade increased both the value
of furs and the intensity of hunting); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943 (explaining that bans
on the sale of fish and game "facilitate conservation by discouraging the entry of profit seeking
hunters or fishermen").
128 Under some circumstances, however, an alienability ban could increase the number of people who engage in direct acquisition of the resource. For example, if the costs of becoming an eagle hunter were low enough (taking into account the price of equipment, the cost of relocating to
an eagle habitat, and the opportunity cost of learning how to hunt eagles), people who are unable
to buy eagles might resort to taking their own. Thus, inalienability would seem to work best as a
backstop or substitute for acquisition limits where external factors like location or skill requirements make acquisition prohibitively costly for most people.
129 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943 (discussing how alienability limits can be of help
"when the state wishes to preserve a group's way of life" and giving examples in which native
Alaskans are given broader hunting and fishing rights than the general public, subject to restrictions on sales).
130 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006); 5o C.F.R. § 22.22 (2007); see United States v. Friday, 525 F3d 938
(ioth Cir. 2008) (discussing these provisions).
131 Commons scholars typically distinguish open-access resources from limited-access commons
that are closed to all but specified commoners. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS 48 (199o). For discussions of alienability in the context of limited-access commons,
see, for example, Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of
Institutionsfor Common Property Resource Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 247, 261-62
(1992); and Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 11o YALE L.J. 549, 566
(2001).
132 See

OSTROM, supra note 13I , at 48; see also Elinor Ostrom, Design Principles of Robust
Property-Rights Institutions: What Have We Learned?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND
POLICIES (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1304708.
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ited group of households is permitted access to a fish pond, making the
withdrawn fish inalienable may obviate the need to place any firm
limit on the number of fish that each household can withdraw. The
demand for fish is effectively capped by the limited capacity of the
commoners to make personal use of the fish, and, assuming this personal consumption does not threaten the sustainability of the fish
population, the resource will not be overdrawn. 133 Richard Epstein
134
has applied similar analysis to the system of riparian rights.
Of course, commoners who doubted the continued availability of
the resource might overharvest even in this context if the resource
could be successfully stockpiled and stored over time for future use.
Indeed, the fear that other commoners might engage in resourceendangering stockpiling could itself generate such doubt. But unless
external forces threatened the continued viability of the replenishing
resource, the problem would take the form of an Assurance Game,
which should not be difficult for a rational community to solve. 135 An
alienability limit, then, could successfully stand in for a harvesting
limit as long as personal consumption does not outstrip sustainability
and commoners have faith in the continued availability of the resource.
One problem with using an alienability limit in place of a harvesting limit is the former's rough-gauge nature, which will generate optimal harvesting levels only under special circumstances. In the fishing
example, some amount of harvesting is efficient, as long as it does not
threaten the sustainability of the fish pond. If personal consumption
by the commoners is below this threshold, we need not worry about
overharvesting if alienability is restricted. However, we might worry
about underharvesting; it would be mere happenstance if personal
consumption by the commoners reached the optimal harvesting level
without going over. Limiting demand through alienability restrictions
is not a very fine-grained way to limit harvesting, but the cost of its

133 This assumes either that fish are used only in customary ways, such as for bait or food, or
that use restrictions operate in conjunction with alienability limits. Otherwise, the development
of new uses for the resource could cause demand to rise unexpectedly beyond the usual selfenforcing caps associated with satiation. Cf.Smith, supra note 65, at 473 (explaining that riparianism works as "a rough proxy for quantity" but noting that some systems add use restrictions
that prioritize "natural wants" over "artificial wants").
134 Epstein, supra note 2, at 979-82.
135 The Assurance Game features a payoff structure in which each party does best (both individually and jointly) by cooperating, provided the other party does so as well. See Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Essay, ConsumerPreferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public
Goods, io8 YALE L.J. 377. 392 nn.39-4o (1998) and sources cited therein (describing the Assurance Game and noting variations of it); Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate
of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114-I5 (1967) (presenting the "assurance problem'.
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imperfections may136be less than the added cost of enforcing a numeric
limit on harvests.

137
I have focused so far on how the inalienability of resource units
eases pressures toward overharvesting by limiting the pool of potential
demanders. In other words, it is the number of the commoners and
their consumption habits, not their identity, that does the work in curtailing resource withdrawal. There is nothing about this rationale that
would call for limiting the alienability of membership slots within the
limited-access commons, at least if problematic selection effects were
not at issue. 138 Yet this latter sort of inalienability has received attention in the literature on limited-access commons, 39 and it is worth noting why it might be important, either on its own or in combination
with limits on the alienability of resource units. If the sustainability of
a resource in a limited-access commons depends to some extent on cooperation among the commoners, as will typically be the case, then
longevity within the community may be useful in fostering that cooperation. Not only might the commoners gain experience with each
other that would foster trust, but the game among them would140 be
turned by virtue of inalienability into one of indefinite repeat play.
Another consideration, explored further in the next section, relates
to the mechanism for allocating slots within the limited-access commons in the first instance. If this mechanism is designed to select for
(or induce self-selection for) cooperative tendencies, then free alienability would undo that selection work. On this account, alienability restrictions lower the cost of cooperation by avoiding the need to reapply

136 Cf. Smith, supra note 65, at 473 (discussing the use of "rough prox[ies]" in the context of water rights).
137 See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:Information As a
Common-Pool Resource, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at Iii, 121 (distin-

guishing a "resource system" from "resource units"); Dean Lueck, First PossessionAs the Basis of
Property, in

PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 200, 202 (Terry L.

Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (distinguishing resource "stocks" from "flows").
138 If the original members of the limited-access commons won their slots by some means other
than a free market allocation, and if potential members are heterogeneous in their capacity to demand the resource, then making the slots alienable might introduce "super-demanders" who
would consume the resource at much higher levels than did the departing members they are replacing. Alienability would not introduce a selection effect if the original allocation already drew
in super-demanders or if the resource is of a type for which demand does not vary widely among
individuals or households.
139 See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 131, at 566; McKean, supra note 131, at 261-62.
140 See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 131, at 574-77. Limiting those to whom membership
slots may be alienated might be similarly motivated. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information
Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV 1835, 1894-97 (2oo6) (discussing
Taormina Theosophical Community v. Silver, i9o Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. App. 1983), which involved
covenants restricting ownership within a residential community to Theosophical Society members
aged 5o and over).
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selection criteria over time. The price, of course, is that higher valuers
who would be capable of meeting those criteria are shut out.
Now that we have seen how alienability limits can supplement or
substitute for direct acquisition rules in preventing overharvesting, it is
worth noting two other possible margins for intervention: use and exclusion. To return to the fishing example, suppose that instead of directly limiting the take or indirectly controlling it through restrictions
4
on alienability, limits were instead placed on how fish could be used.1 1
For example, a prohibition on freezing (or perhaps even refrigerating)
the fish would effectively force it to be used locally for immediate consumption, or not at all. Alternatively, processing the fish to produce
fishmeal, fish oil, or fish sticks might be prohibited, but using the fish
for fillets or as treats for seals might be permitted. This approach
would limit demand for the fish in ways that, depending on conditions
in the relevant markets, might have the effect of deterring overharvesting. But it would also have the disadvantage of arbitrarily eliminating
categories of uses that might be more highly valued.
Adding exclusion rights - as through parcelization - represents a
well-known response to commons tragedies. 142 However, such alternatives are not always feasible; some resources, such as water or roving
animal populations, cannot be contained by boundary lines or
fences. 143 More interestingly, limits on exclusion can also reduce
overharvesting incentives, albeit in a much blunter way. In the fishing
case, we might imagine something like Michael Heller's "Poach Pond,"
where catching fish confers no rights of ownership at all. 144 Because
anyone may appropriate fish from anyone else (up until the point of
actual consumption), people may not bother fishing, choosing instead
"to wait on shore and poach others' catches."'1 45 Heller goes on to explain that underfishing might not be the inevitable result; indeed, depending on the costs of fishing and the costs of preventing poaching
through self-help, overfishing might even result. 146 In any case, removing exclusion rights from the fish would be highly unlikely to yield
optimal fishing rates, and would almost certainly entail wasteful fight147
ing over resources.
141 See Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S421, S4 3 6 (2002) (observing that "at some point restrictions on use function as substitutes for
closed access").
142 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 131, at 12-13; Ellickson, supra note 124, at I327-30.
143 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 131, at 13; Smith, supra note 65, at 448 & n.io.
144 Heller, Anticommons, supra note I8,at 675.
145 Id.
146 Id.

147 It is difficult to say much about an example like Poach Pond without more information
about the other rights (and their enforcement levels) that form the backdrop against which fish
may be taken. For example, if a fisher could quickly put the fish in her (privately owned) basket
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A liability rule regime represents a different kind of intrusion into
the right to exclude, 14 8 and one that would avoid the wasteful fights of
Poach Pond. Suppose, for example, that anyone could take any fish
from any fisher by paying a preset fee. Depending on the size of the
fee, the frequency with which this option is exercised, and the struc149
ture of the market, fishing levels might well be affected.
In sum, restricting alienability is one way to turn back threats to a
common resource, but it must be compared with other available
chokepoints for managing the potential tragedy. Significantly, inalienability does its work in this story through ex ante incentive effects: without the prospect of selling, those with access to the resource
have a dampened incentive to harvest.
B. Underinvestment
People may be insufficiently motivated to produce goods for which
they cannot fully internalize the benefits. 150 This point is often made
in connection with "public goods," which are nonrival and nonexcludable.'
Some public goods, such as national defense, are provided by
the government, with contributions coercively collected through taxation. But there are many other settings in which people cannot capture all of the benefits of their actions. When I paint my house or
mow the yard, for example, my neighbors need not pay me for the

and clutch it to her person, the lack of property rights in the fish itself might be of little moment
- some other right of the individual would be violated in wresting the fish away. See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRIES 7, 11-13 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., i998) (explaining how rights may "effectively shield" other, unprotected liberties); Balganesh, supra note 3, at 604-05 & nn.36-37 (citing
Kramer, supra, and discussing this "'shielding' thesis"). If we instead assume a regime in which
no private property rights exist at all, other questions emerge - such as how a fisher comes to
possess the equipment for catching fish in the first place.
148 The right to exclude is usually associated with property rule protection, which in turn is
typified by injunctive relief. For a discussion of this view and a challenge to it, see generally Balganesh, supra note 3.
149 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the
Cathedral, ioo MICH. L. REV. 6oi, 633-34 (2001) (discussing how the choice between property

rules and liability rules bears on ex ante investment choices). The example in the text refers to a
very simple liability rule regime in which only a single taking of each fish would be possible;
many more complicated variations on liability rules have been explored that could produce different results. See infra note 192.
150 Underprovision will not result if enough of the benefits are internalized to make the efficient
level of provision worthwhile. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276 (2007) (arguing that full internalization is unnecessary to incentivize
innovation). This is the flip side of the observation that negative externalities will not always
produce inefficiencies. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Win. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMICA 371, 38o-8i (1962).
151 See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986).
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spillover benefits they receive. 15 2 Often outsiders can be excluded
from a nonrival good - whether formally, in the case of club goods
that can be accessed only by members, or informally, when the good's
effects are geographically bounded and most people are too far away
to receive any benefit. 15 3 Even so, the good will remain nonexcludable
within the club or within the locality, creating the risk that insiders
will fail to make sufficient investments.
Use restrictions that directly compel a set of inputs represent one
response. For example, households that purchase homes in a commoninterest community agree to be bound by a set of covenants, which
may include affirmative obligations with regard to upkeep and maintenance. Zoning laws or other local ordinances can operate similarly.1 5 4 But specifying inputs and monitoring to detect and punish
violations can be prohibitively costly in some contexts. Consider, for
example, the local public good of collective cheering and enthusiasm at
a sporting event or concert. Issuing mandates that people cheer at
particular intervals upon pain of ejection from the stadium is unlikely
to be a viable strategy. Instead, one might devise acquisition requirements that induce especially enthusiastic people to self-select. If willingness to pay were a good proxy for enthusiasm levels, ordinary market allocation with full alienability would do the trick. But given
different background wealth levels, this may be far from the case.
Perhaps in part for this reason, it is commonplace for entertainments that depend on crowd enthusiasm for their success to be sold

below market-clearing prices.' 5 5 The resulting queue acts as a screen-

152 See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liabilityfor Unrequested Benefits 2-4 (Univ.
of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 388, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= io88796.
153 On club goods, see, for example, James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
ECONOMICA I (1965). On distance as a de facto exclusionary mechanism, see Thr .inn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT,
AND LAW, supra note 137, at 73, 76.
154 For a recent example, see Associated Press, Mow Your Lawn... or Risk Jail Time in Canton, Ohio, USATODAY.COM, June 3, 2oo8, http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2oo8-o6-031773423079.x.htm.
155 See Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of Excess Demand for Tickets, iS
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 5 1I, 5 15-17 (1994) (presenting a model of concert pricing in
which "the highest-demand buyers in terms of money price will generally not be the 'best audience' in their own estimation"; if "propensities to make noise are inversely correlated with pure
reservation prices," scalping could reduce welfare by pricing out the part of the audience that is
most essential to the experience); see also Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and
Other Examples of Social Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. i1o9 (191i ) (noting the social
interaction effects associated with consuming events); Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White,
The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Educationand Other Services in Which the Customers Are
Inputs, 103 J. POL. ECON. 573, 58i n.i5 (1995) (suggesting that enthusiasm-related externalities
produced by season ticket-holders at sporting events might explain the lower prices and other
benefits offered to that group).
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ing device that arguably does a better job of weeding out the unenthusiastic than could price alone.' 56 This two-part pricing mechanism of
money and queuing will fall apart, however, if free alienability of tickets is permitted. Limits on ticket "scalping," then, can be understood
as helping to ensure adequate investments in a local public good
(crowd enthusiasm) by getting good cooperators in that endeavor to select themselves into the crowd. 157 Of course, if a ticket-holder cannot
attend the game and is unable to alienate her ticket, the resulting
empty seat is presumably worse for crowd morale - not to mention
concession stand sales - than even the most unenthusiastic attendee. 158 But that result could be avoided with a simple mechanism for
reselling tickets to the ticket issuer; full alienability at market-clearing
prices would not be necessary.
In other settings, inalienability operates even more straightforwardly to ensure that appropriate investments are made in local public
goods.' 5 9 Consider higher education admissions policies, which try to
select those who will be good contributors to the academic and social
climate of the school, as well as to the public good of the school's reputation (shared by all past and future graduates). One cannot sell one's
seat in Acme Law School's entering class, nor can one sell one's diploma from that institution, because doing so would substitute pure
market allocation methods for other allocation mechanisms that are
deemed better at inducing meaningful cooperation in the relevant educational and reputational enterprises. The alienability restriction is essential to enforcing acquisition limits.

156 The queue may also be sought for its own sake by the purveyors of the entertainment, as
evidence of popular demand. See Becker, supra note i55, at IiIo (positing that certain pricing
strategies may be explained by the fact that "the pleasure from a good is greater when many people want to consume it").
157 The economic literature on ticket scalping suggests a number of alternative explanations for
opposition to scalping. See, e.g., Courty, supra note 81, at 94-95 (producers wish to distance
themselves from scalpers due to consumer pressure, or want to capture the "late market" themselves); Craig A. Depken, II, Another Look at Anti-Scalping Laws: Theory and Evidence, 130
PUB. CHOICE 55 (2oo7) (reviewing past literature and examining effects on prices); James L.
Swofford, Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy Toward Ticket Scalping, 27 PUB. FIN. REV
531, 535-38 (1999) (producers wish to pass surplus to consumers to build goodwill).
158 See Chris Isidore, In Defense of $io,ooo Super Bowl Tickets, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 31,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2oo7/cu/3i/commentary/sportsbiz/index.htm (discussing financial impact of no-shows).
159 Susan Rose-Ackerman discusses this point using the example of the Homesteading Acts,
under which homesteaders could acquire title only by holding the land for some period of time
and improving it in specified ways. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 940, 957-59. There, both
use and alienability restrictions were bundled within a protracted acquisition protocol, which arguably induced self-selection by (only) those willing and able to make the prescribed investments
on the land. See id. at 96o-6i. For a counterargument that homesteading laws may have actually
impeded settlement by placing too many restrictions on the land, see Epstein, supra note 2, at 989.
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A different and presumably unsustainable way of running a law
school would be to allow free alienability of seats, but require students
to make particular, specified investments both while in school and after graduating, on pain of ejection from the school or (later) revocation
of the diploma. These requirements would amount to use restrictions
on the law school seat or diploma. Limits on exclusion might also be
employed in conjunction with use restrictions. For example, the institution could retain a call option on the seat and the diploma, which
could be exercised if investment levels fell below certain standards.
Law school already fits this model to the extent that nondisruptive
class attendance and some minimum level of exam performance condition one's entitlement to remain. But inalienability remains central,
complementing these other efforts to elicit appropriate investments.
Inalienability's role in facilitating the distribution of in-kind benefits, such as subsidized housing or food stamps, can also be understood
as an investment problem. 160 Those providing the in-kind benefits
want the holders of the entitlement to invest in a public good - poverty alleviation - using specified means. Some people are not wellpositioned to invest in poverty alleviation by those means, either because they are not poor or because they do not wish to use the offered
goods. Inalienability not only facilitates the application of meanstesting to recipients, but also induces self-selection by those who find
the in-kind benefits valuable. 16 1 Indeed, even in the absence of a government program, people seeking to access the resources of others
might signal their willingness to engage in poverty reduction by requesting in-kind assistance of a sort that is very difficult to alienate,
162
such as a hot meal.
These examples involving the below-market-price provision of resources relate to a larger point about alienability limits: their role in

160 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 961 (discussing the relevance of alienability restrictions
to welfare policy).
161 See id. at 940, 96, (explaining how alienability restrictions can lead those for whom a benefit is intended to self-identify, and can ration goods to those who will use them themselves); cf
David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the PersonalChoice Model for Rationing
Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 81S, 825-32 (2004) (discussing how informal rationing of welfare
benefits might be accomplished through differential responses to various requirements and hurdles, as well as the possibility that such mechanisms would fail to select for need).
162 A signal must be more costly for those who lack the desired underlying characteristic than
for those who possess it.

See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW

123 (994) (defining signaling). Requesting food always entails some up-front costs (in time, effort, or dignity), but the food itself provides a larger offsetting benefit for those in dire need of a
meal than it would for the well-fed. Thus, a soup kitchen featuring food that is difficult to transport or resell operates as a screening device. See id. (defining screening). See generally Super,
supra note 161 (similar analysis regarding design of welfare policy).
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facilitating price discrimination. 63 The efficiency story surrounding
price discrimination is complex, 164 but Harold Demsetz's observation
that price discrimination can facilitate the private production of public
goods seems especially relevant to this Article's focus on collective action problems. 1 6
Inalienability in service of price discrimination
might, therefore, offer an alternative to coercive taxation under some
circumstances.
C. Holding Out
The tragedy of the commons, which manifests in either overharvesting or underinvestment behaviors, has been paired in the literature
with the tragedy of the anticommons. 66 In an anticommons, a desired
use of a resource requires assembling permission or fragmentary entitlements from a number of parties. Aside from the obvious costs of
communicating and coordinating with large numbers of parties, the
anticommons presents a central strategic dilemma - the possibility
that a party whose entitlement is crucial to the necessary assembly will
167
attempt to "hold out" for a larger share of the assembly surplus.
Each fragment holder has a veto power enabling her to block the
whole assembly (assuming all pieces are truly indispensable), creating
the possibility that value will be dissipated in negotiations, that negotiations will break down altogether and prevent an efficient assembly
from taking place, or that the potential for these results will deter
any effort at negotiations. 168 The essential problem is one of a "thin
market" in which transactions must occur, if at all, between specific
69
parties. 1
This same problem of monopoly power can arise in two-party interactions as well, and several of the examples above - domain

163 See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C.
L. REV. 577, 625-27 (2003) (explaining this point in the context of the first sale doctrine).
164 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note iio; Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1505-o8 (2004).
165 See Harold Demsetz, The PrivateProduction of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 301-04
(1970).

166 See, e.g., Heller, Anticommons, supra note 18, at 673-79; see also James M. Buchanan &
Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. I (2000). The anticommons idea originated in Frank Michelman's conception of a regulatory regime that would be the
"converse" of a commons. See Michelman, supra note 124, at 6, 9; see also Frank Michelman, Remarks at Property Panel, Association of American Law Schools: Is the Tragedy of The Common
Inevitable? 6-7 (Jan. 1985) (transcript on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (defining the
"anti-common").
167 For an extended discussion of this point with cites to relevant literature, see Fennell, supra
note i8, at 926-29, 946-52.
168 See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (199i); Fennell,
supra note 18, at 926-29, 946-52.
169 See Merrill, supra note 43, at 75-78.
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names, land use rights, damaging information, and perhaps patents can present the famously costly bilateral monopoly. The structure of
the problem is the same as in the anticommons, in that the property
owner holds a veto power or monopoly over an entitlement essential to
the desired resource use of another party.1 70 Again, value is dissipated
as the high valuer and the entitlement holder vie for larger shares of
the often enormous surplus that will be generated by the transfer. If
the parties bluff too hard, the deal may not go through at all.' 7 ' Both
the dissipation of value through wrangling and the thwarted exchange
produce inefficiencies.' 7 2
It is worth emphasizing here that property's grant of veto power is
not an unusual or anomalous feature, but rather lies at the heart of the
institution itself. 1 3 The temporal, spatial, and conceptual bounds of
an owner's holdings limit the significance of the resulting monopoly
power in most circumstances. 7 4 For example, nearby pieces of property are often very close substitutes for each other, despite each being
locationally unique. 75 Nonetheless, so long as property rule protection
remains in force, each owner controls something that no other person
can precisely supply. Deciding when to recognize and when to restrict
that monopoly power is a central dilemma in property law.
This problem is usually approached by weighing the benefits and
risks of reducing exclusion rights through liability rules. But such limits on exclusion represent only one of several possible points of intervention; monopoly power giving rise to holdout problems might instead be addressed through limits on alienability, use, acquisition, or
some combination of these. These approaches seek not to wrest the
entitlement from the hands of the lower-valuing monopolist but to increase the chance that the higher-valuing user will have the entitlement at the outset. Acquisition limits attempt this directly: some proxy
characteristic thought to correlate with being a high-valuing user of
the entitlement is made a prerequisite for acquiring the entitlement.
170 Problems of "extortion," where a party seeks payment for refraining from doing something
she has no independent interest in doing, boil down to monopoly power as well. See Harold
Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, i J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22-25 (0972).
171 Cf Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 577 (993) (explaining that in private necessity cases "the
bargaining range is so large that there is some risk that no deal will be struck as each side campaigns for the larger fraction of the contested domain").
172

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 706-07 (9th ed.

2oo8) (noting these risks in the context of injunctive relief).
173 The power to veto a transaction is the defining characteristic of "property rules," which,
true to their name, commonly protect property interests. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i,
at 1092.
174

See Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticalsand Telecommu-

nications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (2o05).
175 See id.
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To make the limitation meaningful, further alienability must be restricted to those possessing the same proxy characteristic. Use limits
could similarly act as screens, especially
if a use is compelled that stra17 6
tegic resellers would find costly.
Alienability restrictions more straightforwardly select against those
whose primary value is in reselling. Instead of an administrator choosing a proxy characteristic capable of distinguishing between high and
low valuers, resale limits induce self-selection by those who are relatively high valuers.177 For example, parties might be required to hold
the entitlement for some period of time before reselling it. If the holding period were set at a level that would be unprofitably long for those
bent on resale but comfortably short for anyone making personal use
of the entitlement, it would tend to screen out low-valuing acquirers.17 8 Complete bans on alienability would even more strongly discourage acquisition by low valuers hoping to resell. Thus, alienability
restrictions can drive low valuers out of the marketplace without the
need for any administrative judgments about absolute or relative
valuations. The exit of these would-be transactors can, in turn, forestall costly holdout problems that might otherwise emerge. 17 9
However, this benefit comes with some significant costs attached.
Figure I, which sets out the effects of alienability restrictions schematically, illustrates the resulting tradeoff.

176 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 955-56, 960-6i (discussing "coerced use" as a means of
targeting benefits).
177 See infra pp. 1453-54 (discussing self-selection induced by alienability limits). Inalienability
thus serves as a screening mechanism. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 162, at 122-23 (explaining
how screening induces revelation of private, nonverifiable information).
178 See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities,
39 U. MicHi. J.L. REFORM 543 (2006) (urging a three-year holding period for initial purchasers of
certain categories of residential property to discourage real-estate speculation).
179 This is not to suggest that high valuers or long-term holders are temperamentally disinclined to strategically squeeze surplus out of a deal when they can. The point is simply that fewer
transactions (and hence fewer potentially problematic transactions) are necessary to move goods
to their highest valuers if those who acquire in the first place are more likely to be high valuers
themselves.
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FIGURE i. EFFECTS OF INALIENABILITY
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In this schematic, the entitlement in question comes from some
"source." If resale of the entitlement is restricted, a category of potential acquirers ("middlepeople") will exit from the market, as indicated
by the dashed middle box. With the middlepeople out of the picture,
high valuers can acquire the good directly from the source and avoid
any bargaining or holdout problems associated with buying from an
intermediary. But the exit of the middlepeople also generates a number of potential costs, the existence and magnitude of which will depend on empirical facts about the relevant markets and on the specific
design of the inalienability rule in use. 18 0
First, to the extent that the middlepeople were actually reaching a
group of would-be buyers who would not otherwise acquire the good
(represented by the dashed upper right-hand box), there is an efficiency loss. Here, we confront the question raised in section I.C of
whether the intermediaries are offering anything of value by bridging
a divide of some kind, whether spatial, temporal, informational, or
risk-based. Second, while the inability to resell will weed out many
low valuers, not all of those who acquire the good for their own use
will necessarily be (or remain over time) the highest valuers of the
good. Indeed, with no middlepeople competing to snap up entitlements, hold them, and route them to higher valuers, this result becomes more likely. Thus, restrictions that block resales may lock
goods in suboptimal uses, as indicated by the black horizontal bar in
the lower right block of Figure i.

180 See infra Part HI.
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Finally, any drop in overall demand that results from the exit of the
middlepeople could change the supply of the good. 18 1 Whether this
will be the case, and whether it will be problematic, depends on the
nature of the good. Inventions, for example, are likely to be more sensitive to changes in demand than domain names, which are simply
combinations of letters or words drawn from the preexisting language.
In some cases, a drop in demand could actually increase supply, as
where natural resources are concerned. Reducing the demand for fish,
for example, could increase the overall fish population.

III. INALIENABILITY'S DOMAIN
The discussion to this point has established two things. First, the
transfer of some goods that seem appropriately market-allocated can
nonetheless generate anxiety that may be traceable in part to inefficiencies. Second, inalienability offers one possible, if imperfect, response - a point that becomes especially clear when we see alienability as one margin that might be adjusted to control commons and
anticommons tragedies. Taken together, these observations lead us to
ask whether, and under what circumstances, inalienability could offer
useful traction for resource dilemmas in general and holdout problems
in particular. In the balance of the Article, I take up that inquiry.
Although I look at how inalienability rules might serve efficiency
goals, the distributive effects of choices about alienability are also relevant - whether as an independent reason for making an adjustment,
or as an additional benefit or countervailing consideration. Significantly, inalienability rules can influence the division of surplus that results from a transfer by limiting the range of possible bargains.' 82
More generally, alienability underpins property's dual character as a
source of wealth-building potential and as a source of consumption
value. 183 Because inalienability breaks apart these two elements, it
181 For a discussion of the relevance of output to questions of alienability, see Levmore, supra
note 7, at i16-21.
182 See infra section III.A.3.
183 This dichotomy appears frequently in the property literature, often building explicitly on
KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION (Frederick

Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., George Allen & Unwin 1972) (1887), which
defined and distinguished "use-value" and "exchange value," id. at 2-8. See, e.g., JOHN R.
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

PLACE 1-2 (2Oth anniversary ed. 2007); Eduardo Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2009) (manuscript at 16-23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=i 138714 (invoking the "use value" and "exchange value" distinction in the context of homes); see also JOHN
CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY 128 (1994) (distinguishing "control ownership" from
"income ownership"); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 26-27 (1996) (distinguishing "the

use of things" from "the allocation of items of social wealth"); Madeline Morris, The Structure of
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 837-38 (1993) (distinguishing "in-kind enjoyment" from
"monetary compensation").
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may be sought where use, but not wealth extraction, is viewed as normatively desirable. 18 4 Other normative considerations, including the
preservation of autonomy, also play a role in evaluating alienability
choices.
I start by cataloguing the ways in which alienability can be adjusted and showing how these adjustments interact with other features
of property entitlements. Inalienability rules - no less than liability
rules - can be fine-tuned in numerous ways to achieve particular objectives. With this expanded menu in mind, I examine how inalienability rules stack up against restrictions on exclusion and use. I close
with some specific suggestions for better integrating inalienability into
the legal toolkit.
A. Alienability Adjustments
Calabresi and Melamed and their successors have generally conceived of inalienability rules as different in kind from property rules
and liability rules. 185 There is some basis for this intuition. Property
rules and liability rules represent different ways of dividing up control
over the fact and the terms of the entitlement transfer between owners
and nonowners. 186 In the case of completely inalienable goods, in contrast, control over potential transactions is held socially rather than
split between the transacting parties. But absolute bans on alienability
are relatively rare, and the entitlements to which they apply most
clearly tend to be those for which the appellation of "property" is
highly questionable. 187 More commonly, alienability is restricted, not
prohibited. Adjustments to alienability thus typically occur against a
backdrop in which control over transfers has already been divided up
in some manner between owners and nonowners. 188 Revisiting the dif184 See, e.g., Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 85-86.
185 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i, at 1093 (describing "inalienability rules" as
"quite different from property and liability rules" in that they "not only 'protect' the entitlement"
but "may also be viewed as limiting or regulating the grant of the entitlement itself"); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, io9 HARV
L. REV. 713, 715 n.i (1996).
186 My focus on "control" here echoes in part and diverges in part from Christman's characterization of "control rights" as distinct from "income rights." See CHRISTMAN, supra note 183, at
127-31.
187 It is not clear whether inalienability is a cause or a consequence of the item's uncertain
property status in these cases. Compare HONORt, supra note 5, at 18i ("When the legislature or
courts think that an interest should be alienable and transmissible, they reify it and say that it can
be owned."), with J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 129-30 (997) (saying of
choses in action: "It is not because they are alienable that they are things. Rather it is because
they are things that they are alienable." (emphasis omitted)).
188 Owners are often in the role of "sellers" and nonowners in the role of "buyers," although a
number of other owner/nonowner pairings are possible, such as donor and donee, mortgagor and
mortgagee, takee and taker, or defendant and plaintiff.
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ferent ways that transaction control can be allocated offers a convenient starting point for examining how inalienability rules can change
things.
i. Two Dimensions of Control over Transfers. - Control over
transfers is divided between owners and nonowners along two dimensions, as shown in Figure 2.189
FIGURE 2. CONTROL OVER TRANSACTIONS

Transfer
Type
Elements
of Control
Whether
Transfer
Occurs
Transfer Price

Call Option

Voluntary
Transfer

Nonowner
Control

Owner-Nonowner
Control

Owner Control

Owner-Nonowner
Control

Collective or
Nonowner
Control

Put Option

I
Collective or
Owner
Control

I

First, consider the degree of control that the owner has over the
fact of the transaction. 190 This control can range from zero, when the
entitlement is subject to a "call option" held by another party, to absolute, when the entitlement comes with a "put option" that lets the
owner force a sale on another party.19 ' In between these extremes we
find the usual case, where the owner is free to initiate and resist trans189 A recent working paper by Matteo Rizzolli includes a figure that similarly sets out three
columns for "put-option liability rule," "property rule," and "call-option liability rule."

Rizzolli,

supra note 2, § 3-1, fig.3-1. Rizzolli's schematic, however, is used to illustrate the Hohfeldian
equivalents that each party holds under each type of rule and to make observations about the effects of call options and put options, respectively, on the ownership package. See id. § 3.1 (citing
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710 (1917)). My depiction differs in that it breaks apart the two elements of transfer
control represented by the two rows in Figure 2. This approach yields a refinement in conclusions. Rizzolli indicates that "[tlhe bundle of rights is 'enriched' under put-option liability rules,"
id., but my analysis shows a more complex picture: a put option grants more control over the fact
of the transfer but withdraws control from the owner over the price at which the transfer occurs.
For further discussion of the operation of put options, see, for example, Ayres, supra note 96, at
803-12.

190 Transfer control could be broken down further. See Morris, supra note 183, 833-37, 843
(discussing "initiation choice" and "veto power," both of which involve control over whether
a transfer occurs and which collectively amount to "transfer control" or "a transfer autonomy
element").
191 See, e.g., id. at 851-56 (describing the liability rule, or call option, and the "Reverse Liability
rule," or put option).
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actions, but may only complete a transaction with the agreement of a
willing buyer (or donee). The "Whether Transfer Occurs" row in Figure 2 sets out these possibilities. Voluntary transfers, which require
the consent of both parties, take place in the domain of property rules.
Calls and puts represent two types of liability rules, with the "call"
version corresponding to ordinary or traditional liability rules.1 92
Second, there is the degree of control that the owner has over the
price at which any transfer will occur. Once again, this can range
from zero, as when the strike price of a call or put option is set by
someone else, to absolute, when the owner can specify the price and
the buyer is bound to accept it. The typical case lies in between,
where the price, and hence the division of surplus from the transfer, is
subject to negotiation. The "Transfer Price" row in Figure 2 reflects
how price control is split up under calls, voluntary transfers, and puts,
respectively. For both calls and puts, the transfer price may be set in
more than one way. Two possibilities are expressly noted: that a collective decisionmaker such as a court or agency would set the price, or
that the party not holding the option would have previously set the
price ("written the option") for the other party to exercise. Although
most discussions of liability rules presuppose that transfer prices will
be determined by a collective body, it is also possible to devise systems
that place pricing in the hands of the party against whom the option
193
can be exercised.
As Calabresi and Melamed recognized, more than one transfer type
may apply to a given entitlement, such as a house. 194 A property rule
usually protects one's home against involuntary transfers, but the government holds a call option when it acts pursuant to its eminent domain powers. 19s The owner may also be said to hold a put option that
may be exercised against the government and possibly also against her
mortgagee. She can transfer the property to the government by failing
to pay her property taxes, 196 and if she lives in a jurisdiction that has
192 See id.; see also Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the
Design of Liability Rules, loo MICH. L. REV i, S-6 (2ooi). Scholars have identified numerous
ways to structure and combine calls and puts in order to achieve particular objectives. For a recent treatment with discussions of other relevant literature, see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW:
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005). These complex alternatives are not reflected in Figure 2, but could play a role in designing real-world inalienability rules.
193 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 1i8 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 14o6, 1416-17
(2005).
194 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note i, at 1093.
195 See id.
196 Although procedures vary, a protracted failure to pay past-due taxes can result in a transfer
of the property to the government. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 211.78g (LexisNexis
2006). More generally, we might treat any abandonment right as a put option good against the
world, at a strike price of zero. Cf Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly
Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REv LITIG. 47 (2004) (analyzing the plaintiff's option to abandon
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an antideficiency law (or if she is holding a non-recourse loan, or is
judgment-proof), she can effectively force the mortgagee to "purchase"
the property from her at a price equal to her unpaid balance on the
home loan. 97
2. Alienability Restrictions and Transaction Control. - Alienability restrictions can alter the control that the parties have over the fact
of the transfer or the control that the parties have over the transfer
price. Alternatively, a restriction might specify that certain kinds of
sales attempts, when coupled with other criteria, will trigger a shift
from the voluntary transfer column in Figure 2 to the call or put option columns, or give rise to other consequences, such as criminal penalties. These possibilities will be discussed in turn.
(a) Limits on Whether a Transfer Occurs. - The law need not
merely divide up control over transfers between owners and nonowners; it may also condition or limit transfers that both parties desire.
Such conditions and limitations can take many forms, ranging from
taxes, 198 to procedural requirements, to substantive criteria that the
parties must meet to engage in a transfer (such as holding periods or
age restrictions), to restrictions on when or how a particular good may
be sold, 199 to outright bans on transfers. Private parties may also seek
a lawsuit). If proper disposal is required (as for hazardous wastes), the put option may carry a
negative price or the transfer may require the consent of the transferee. For a discussion of the
limits that the law places on abandonment, including a general prohibition on the abandonment
of land, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (Oct. 23, 2oo8) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
197 Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2009) (manuscript at 26-35), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 11o6907 (examining support for an "option model" of foreclosure decisions).
198 For example, the possibility of taxing the transfer of financial instruments in order to curb
speculative activity has recently received renewed attention. See Joseph J. Thorndike, Speculation and Taxation: Time for a Transaction Tax?, iig TAX NOTES 1367 (2008) (surveying implemented and proposed transfer taxes, including one proposed by economist Dean Baker); Stephen
Mihm, The 8th Annual Year in Ideas: The Stock Transfer Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. i4, 2008, § 6
(Magazine), at 74, 74-76 (discussing Baker's proposal and its antecedents); see also Robert Pollin,
Dean Baker & Mark Schaberg, Securities Transaction Taxes for U.S. FinancialMarkets (Political
Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 20, 20o2), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/working-papers/workingpapersI-50/WP2o.pdf.
199 Such restrictions might set minimum or maximum quantities or require that goods be sold
in particular configurations. See supra note iig. Legal doctrines that specify what particular
sorts of transfers must convey, such as the patent exhaustion doctrine and the first-sale doctrine in
copyright, fall into this category. See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegrationof Intellectual Property 28-49 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 423, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1236273 (discussing these and other intellectual property
doctrines from the perspective of alienability); David J. Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace:
The Accidental Trademark Regime, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1251, 1272-73 (discussing trademark law's
ban on transferring a mark without also transferring goodwill). Not only may the law require
that transfers contain certain minimum packages of rights rather than a subset thereof, it may
mandate that certain rights be held back from packages that are conveyed. See, e.g., JULIE E.
COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 177-8o (2d ed. 2006)
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to limit alienability in various ways. Although the law generally prohibits parties from imposing outright bans on alienability, it may permit more limited restrictions on exactly how and when a good may be
resold.20 0
Legal controls on alienability do not always operate to constrict the
universe of circumstances in which transfers may occur. Instead, the
law might mandate that transfers occur once certain prerequisites have
been met. Under civil rights laws, for example, access to public accommodations and entitlements to jobs and housing cannot be withheld based on membership in a protected class. These laws can be
understood as prescribing the bundling of alienability; an owner's decision to extend access to some requires extending equivalent access to
others.2 0 '
(b) Restrictions on the Transfer Price. - It is also possible to directly constrain the price at which a transfer may occur. At the extreme, goods may be made "market-inalienable 2 0 2 so that they must
transfer at a price of zero or not at all. Lesser restrictions, such as
price floors or ceilings, might be imposed by regulation or through contractual or servitude arrangements. Such restrictions limit how surplus can be divided between the parties, and in so doing, may either
facilitate or discourage efficient transfers. For example, price caps
could make an efficient transfer unprofitable for the seller, while price
floors could make an efficient transfer unprofitable for the buyer. On
the other hand, removing some ground from the possible bargaining
2 03
range could facilitate transactions by cabining stratagems.
Notably, the law can limit control over the transfer price not only
by specifying permissible prices (or price bands), but also by specifying
the protocol that must be used by the parties to arrive at a price. For
example, mandatory transfer protocols (such as auctions) might grant

(citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c), 3 o4 (d) (2006)) (describing nonwaivable rights to terminate certain
copyright grants at specified times under copyright law); Michael Rushton, The Law and Economics of Artists' Inalienable Rights, 25 J. CULTURAL EcoN. 243, 249-50 (2001) (discussing droit de
suite, under which artists retain inalienable rights to a percentage of the proceeds from resale of
their work).
200 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at i95-96 (noting the law's general disfavor
of alienability restrictions on estates in land, as well as some limited exceptions).
201 See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property,9o NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1457-58 (i996). Similar issues of bundled access arise in a variety of other contexts, including debates over "network neutrality." See Brett M. Frischmann, An
Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 925-33,
1008-22 (2005).
202 Radin, Market-Inalienability,supra

note 8, at 1850 ("Something that is market-inalienable

is not to be sold .... ).
203

See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 103-05 (citing and discussing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,

BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 57 (1993)).

1448

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:140 3

power over the price to parties other than the seller.2 0 4 In addition, the
law can decide the degree to which it will permit private parties to
20 5
place limits on the prices that may be charged by others.
(c) Triggersfor Control Shifts or Penalties. - Alienability restrictions need not directly alter the substantive conditions for transfer or
the permissible price. Instead, attempted alienation can be made a
triggering condition for a shift of control - over transfer price, the
0 6
fact of the transfer, or both - between owners and nonowners1
Here, the timing and circumstances of an entitlement's attempted sale
might be treated as important factors in deciding whether to chip
away at the property bundle in other ways or to subject the owner to
some form of liability. For example, property rule protection might be
downgraded to liability rule protection following certain kinds of sales
offers when other criteria are present. Alternatively, penalties might
apply to an attempted sale, as in the blackmail case.
Such alternatives amount to de facto restrictions on the entitlement's alienability, akin to forfeiture restraints on alienability. 207
However, one may lose more or less than the entitlement upon attempting to sell. One might merely lose the chance to extract surplus
from the transfer. Or, in some cases, one might be subject to sanctions
that are more serious than the loss of the entitlement. By providing
for case-by-case review of the circumstances surrounding an attempted
transfer, such an approach can avoid placing a categorical blockade on
sales. But the review introduces costs of its own, including uncertainty
for owners and potential owners.
3. Stronger or Weaker? - Interestingly, it is not always clear
whether alienability restrictions weaken or strengthen property rights.
The ambiguity arises because alienability's value derives not only from
the freedom to engage in (and resist) transfers, but also from the ability
to extract surplus from those transfers. Certain limitations on transactions that make them less likely to occur can also increase the surplus
that a buyer or seller will receive if a transaction does occur. Thus, a
204 A sale through a "no reserve" auction would also involve relinquishing control over the fact
of the transfer, while setting a reserve would preserve a veto over the transaction if the price falls
below a certain level. For a discussion of the potential role of auctions in addressing holdout
problems, see infra section lII.C.2.
205 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007)
(holding that vertical price restraints are not per se violations of the Sherman Act but rather "are
to be judged by the rule of reason").
206 Such arrangements are an example of what Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have
termed "pliability rules." See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, ios
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (discussing "contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with
property rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains; however, once
the relevant condition changes, a different rule protects the entitlement").
207 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 59, at 195 ("A forfeiture restraint provides that if the
grantee attempts to transfer his interest, it is forfeited to another person .... ").
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rule that limits bargaining options may simultaneously enhance bargaining leverage. 208 For example, requiring that jobs or leaseholds
come bundled with particular (non-waivable) protections may simultaneously decrease the chances of landing one of these entitlements while
increasing the surplus that will be gleaned in that event.2 0 9 Where
alienability restrictions apply across the board, they can solve collective action problems that might otherwise lead individuals to cave in
one by one to the surplus-draining demands made by a party with
more leverage.2 1 0 These possibilities offer an intuitive explanation of
2
why greater freedom to alienate may actually be less desirable. 11
Whether or not a particular alienability limit will in fact improve
results for an actor is an empirical question. These limits can often be
conceptualized as legally imposed precommitment devices, similar to
one party (A) tearing out her own steering wheel during a game of
roadway Chicken with another party (B). 2 12 If B indeed faces a
208 Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 58-62 (1986); see also
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22 (paperback ed. ig8o) (noting
"that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate"); Arthur
Kuflick, The UtilitarianLogic ofInalienable Rights, 97 ETHICS 75, 86-87 (1986) (explaining that
while making the right to divorce inalienable may keep some prospective couples away from the
altar, it also removes a bargaining chip from the table that could introduce imbalances into many
marriages that would occur in any case).
209 Cf. Hardin, supra note 208, at 61 (observing that a ban on selling oneself into slavery prevents the destitute from making deals they might prefer, but ensures that the next group up the
economic ladder will be free workers rather than slaves).
210 See id. at 58-62 (discussing the nine-hour work day and other examples). This line of reasoning seems to explain the position taken by tenant farmers in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970). See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 959 n.79. The farmers sought to maintain a key restriction on agricultural payments they received to avoid being compelled by their landlords to
assign their benefits in exchange for the right to work the land. See id.; see also Hardin, supra
note 208, at 62 ("We may not be able to know what were the views of the workers, women, tenant
farmers, and children protected by various pieces of supposedly paternalistic legislation over the
decades, but it is plausible that, had they been able to express a collective will by voting rather
than by individually entering their separate contracts, many of the groups would overwhelmingly
have chosen to restrict themselves as the legislation eventually did.").
211 See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22 (exploring a variety of property law settings in
which "more" is not deemed better than "less"); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 203, at 183-84 (explaining how a nexus requirement for land use exactions could leave owners better off, based on
the empirical prediction that the government would not deny the owner's requested permit if it
were unable to use its denial power to leverage unrelated concessions); W. Stephen Westermann,
Strong Versus Standard Property Entitlements: Toward a New Theory of Legal Entitlements
(Oct. 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id= 1024o8i (arguing that "strong" property entitlements, which come with built-in limitations on what they may be traded for, offer more autonomy to owners because they enhance the
owners' ability to resist trades).
212 In roadway "Chicken," two cars head toward each other on a collision course, each hoping
to force the other to swerve. For a description of the Chicken Game and strategies within it, see,
for example, BAIRD ET AL., supra note 162, at 43-45. The idea of tearing out one's own steering
wheel as a precommitment device in a game of Chicken is often attributed to Thomas Schelling; a
discussion of this strategy and related moves appears in HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION:
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Chicken Game payoff structure, he will see A's precommitment and
swerve; A will then come away with more surplus.2 13 But if B's ordering of payoffs leads him to drive straight ahead notwithstanding this
precommitment, the removal of A's steering wheel deprives A of the
chance to prevent the "crash" of a thwarted bargain. In some cases, of
course, society has made the judgment that the harm from such
thwarted bargains is preferable to other possible outcomes.
Of particular interest for our purposes is the fact that society may
place one party in a "precommitment" position in an effort to influence
the ex ante incentives of the other party. If it is impossible for a person vulnerable to damaging information to buy silence, for example, it
becomes less likely that damaging information will be acquired in the
first place.2 14 Similarly, landowners are prevented from engaging in
certain kinds of bargains over land use rights, on the theory that governmental bodies will acquire (promulgate and enforce) fewer land use
controls if they are unable to use them as leverage to obtain unrelated
or disproportionate benefits from landowners.2 15 Whether such suppositions will play out as hoped depends on a number of factors, including the costs of acquisition and the other benefits (if any) that parties
derive from the entitlements in question.
For similar reasons, parties might wish to restrict their own power
to buy or sell, or to resist buying or selling. Here, law might offer precommitment mechanisms that parties could irrevocably elect. 216 Ayres
and Madison's default alienability limit for injunctions represents just
such a mechanism.2 17 Interestingly, their proposal couples a defendant's commitment to not purchase an injunction with a procedure for
changing the amount of damages that the plaintiff will receive in the
event she elects damages rather than an injunction.2 18 Assuming that
the injunction would be inefficient (the equivalent of a crash in
Chicken), the Ayres and Madison proposal gives the defendant the

METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS II (I965). See also T.C. Schelling, Uncertainty, Brinksmanship,
and the Game of "Chicken," in STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND CONFLICT 74, 82-83 (Kathleen

Archibald ed., 1966) (explaining how an unresponsive or inaccessible steering mechanism could
provide a strategic advantage).
213 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement To
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1049 n.74 (1995) (noting the bargaining advantage
conferred by allowing one party to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer).
214 Laws that mandate the bundling of alienability can also have ex ante effects - both on the
initial choice to acquire an entitlement and on the decision to initiate its transfer. Hence, one effect of civil rights laws may be to induce those bent on discrimination to select out of certain markets. This effect could further the mission of antidiscrimination laws by reducing enforcement
burdens.
215 See infra p. 1455.
216 1 thank Omri Ben-Shahar for comments on this point.
217 See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2.
218 See id. at 79-81.
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ability not only to irrevocably remove his steering wheel, but also to
set the course of the car in what amounts to a partial swerve, thus
making it more likely that the other party will choose to avoid the
crash. 21 9 Auctions can also be cast as precommitment devices that, by
placing binding constraints on a seller's choice set, may yield her a bet220
ter outcome.
B. Inalienability'sEdge
We have good reason to be suspicious of inalienability: it can lock
entitlements into inefficient uses. We should not be surprised, then, to
see that the law usually targets other attributes of property when strategic dilemmas loom. Often this turns out to be just the right move.
But restricting alienability can at times be a fruitful complement to, or
substitute for, other points of intervention into resource tragedies.
Moreover, as the previous section makes clear, inalienability is not a
single switch to be thrown, but rather a spectrum of approaches for altering control over transfers. With this in mind, we can consider when
and how inalienability rules might have an edge over alternative
22l
treatments of common interest tragedies - including doing nothing.
As we have seen, inalienability can affect ex ante incentives to acquire and use entitlements. Foreseeing the inability to resell, a party
will self-select into holding an entitlement only if she expects to be a
222
Of
sufficiently high-valuing user of that entitlement over time.
course, when the situation is examined ex post, the inability to transfer
entitlements to higher-valuing users creates inefficiencies. Distributive
concerns can also arise: inalienability restricts the choice sets of wouldbe buyers as well as those of would-be sellers, even though the parties
may not be equally responsible for the miscalculations and failed pre-

219 See id. at 8o (explaining that, counterintuitively, "the defendant is made better off by asking
the court to increase the potential damages it must pay" and describing the resulting strategic interaction); Hugh Ward, The Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision Problems Modelled by Chicken Supergames, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SC. 23, 39 (1987) (discussing a
game of Chicken in which "[t]he steering wheel can be set at various angles," increasing or de-

creasing the amount that the other party will have to swerve).
220 See, e.g., R. Preston-McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcON. LIT.
699, 703 (i987).
221 If serious problems rarely emerge under status quo arrangements, the costs of any intervention may exceed the benefits. Of course, there is often disagreement about the frequency and se-

verity of particular dilemmas. For example, compare Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at i5-i6, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
i26 S. Ct. 1837 (2oo6) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 639164 (suggesting lack of empirical support for
pervasive holdup problems), with Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in
Support of Petitioners at 6, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 1785363 (stating that
"inappropriate 'holdups' occur on a regular basis under the Federal Circuit's mandatoryinjunction standard").
222 See infra notes 228-235 and accompanying text.
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dictions that placed an entitlement in the hands of the latter rather
than the former. Under what circumstances, then, would we be willing to tolerate these substantial ex post disadvantages in order to glean
the beneficial ex ante effects of alienability restrictions?
My answer comes in two parts. In the balance of this section, I
consider some circumstances in which alienability limits might work
better than placing pressure on (or only on) property's other margins
- acquisition, use, and exclusion. In the next section, III.C, I consider
ways that inalienability rules might be structured to reduce the inefficiency generally associated with them.
i. Administration and Enforcement Advantages. - Because transfers involve at least two parties and are often subject to regulatory
scrutiny for independent reasons, they may be significantly easier to
police than other actions involving resources. Our fish pond example
above showed how inalienability might work as a quick and dirty de
facto harvesting limit, assuming limited appetites and either a limitedaccess commons or one that is prohibitively difficult for more than a
limited number of people to access. While it seems very unlikely that
a no-reselling rule will induce optimal harvesting levels, much less get
entitlements to their highest valuers, the administrative convenience of
the system may outweigh such imperfections. It may be a great deal
than it is to monitor
cheaper to watch for fish leaving the 22community
3
the fishing patterns of the commoners.
Even where acquisition or use limits are in place, inalienability
might plug gaps in the enforcement of these other limits. While it is
easiest to see how such a backstop would work in the context of a
categorical ban (say, on taking eagles), alienability limits might also
fortify more fine-grained limits on acquisition or use. In these cases,
the transfer could provide an occasion for assessing the transferor's
and transferee's right to possess or use the thing. Alienability limits
can also assist in the application of particular criteria to those accessing resources (such as entitlements to enroll in, attend, and graduate
from a given law school). A complete prohibition on transfers would
permit a single gatekeeper to administer these criteria. An alternative
alienability limit would involve making the criteria "run with the enticould be made only to
tlement" servitude-style, 224 so that transfers
2 25
those who met the indicated specifications.
223 Cf Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (noting the lower informational burdens of exclusion as
compared with governance).
224 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 164; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96
GEO. L.J. 885 (2oo8).
225 While it is hard to imagine a law school granting a dispensation to sell one's seat to, say,
anyone who possesses a particular LSAT score and undergraduate GPA, this approach could
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Of course, enforcing inalienability rules is far from costless. Black
markets may develop to circumvent alienability limits in many contexts. 2 26 Efforts to structure alienability in particular ways, as through
an auction system, can invite collusive practices that threaten to undermine the goals of the system.2 2 7 But, significantly, other approaches to resource dilemmas (such as trying to control a common pool resource's depletion through limits on acquisition or use alone) also create pressures in the direction of illicit activity. The point, then, is not
that inalienability rules are always cheap to administer in absolute
terms, nor even that they are always cheaper than other alternatives,
but only that a comparative analysis should be undertaken if society
has made the determination that some intervention is appropriate.
2.
Overcoming Information Asymmetries. - Alienability limits
may be attractive when directly limiting acquisition or use is unduly
expensive. A common culprit in these cases is asymmetrical information. 228 Susan Rose-Ackerman has explored how self-selection
prompted by alienability restrictions can overcome information asymmetries in settings like the Homestead Act. 229 Rather than have an
administrative agent determine who will be a good homesteader, those
who place a high value on homesteading can be prompted to identify
themselves if enough restrictions are placed on the use and resale of
the property. Likewise, Ayres and Madison have explored how those
who highly value an injunction for its own sake (rather than for its exchange value) could be prompted to self-select into that remedy under
a regime that bans reselling the injunction to the defendant.2 30
The potential to weed out those who are strategically acquiring an
entitlement for resale purposes is especially helpful when society is reluctant for distributive or other normative reasons to ration access to a
particular entitlement through direct screening or pricing mechanisms.
For example, suppose an apartment resident plays her trombone very
poorly, so that it causes auditory pain for those in surrounding apartwork reasonably well in other settings, such as transmitting one's unused leasehold to a person

with a certain credit rating and income level.
226 An extensive literature

addresses underground or informal market activity.

See, e.g.,

SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE

URBAN POOR (2006); Symposium, The Informal Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994). Only a
subset of underground activity involves goods that cannot legally be sold, and only a subset of
that subset involves goods that are the subject of stand-alone alienability limits; many goods that
cannot legally be sold (such as illegal drugs) are also illegal to possess or use.
227 See infra notes 264-66.
228 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 939, 946-48.
229 Id. at 939-40, 946-48; cf Strahilevitz, supra note 14o, at 1869-75 (discussing the selfselection induced by "exclusionary vibes" and "exclusionary amenities" as alternatives to direct
exclusion by a gatekeeper, where potential entrants possess private information that is costly for
the gatekeeper to obtain).
230 Ayres & Madison, supra note 2.
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ments. Because budding musicians confront a learning curve, society
may be reluctant to outlaw or fine bad trombone playing, assuming it
is confined to reasonable hours. At the same time, it is almost impossible to distinguish musicians in the early stages of their training from
opportunists hoping to extract payments from their annoyed neighbors.
If the bad-trombone-playing entitlement is inalienable (whether as a
function of law or social norms)

23 1

those who continue to play the

trombone badly will do so for their own reasons, not to gain strategic
leverage. Such trombone playing may still be inefficient in the individual case - perhaps the player lacks talent and will never improve,
and the costs she imposes on her neighbors far exceed the utility she
derives from her attempts to play. But that inefficiency may be counterbalanced by the benefits of living in a society where people are free
(within limits) to nonstrategically play musical instruments at low skill
232
levels.
In other words, we may want to make the entitlement to engage in
a behavior depend on one's reason for wishing to engage in it. Spite
fences provide another example of this impulse. While it may not be
actionable in a given jurisdiction to have a fence that is homely, an unsightly fence constructed with the sole intention of annoying one's
neighbor, whether to extract payments or for some other spiteful purpose, may give rise to a cause of action. 233 The problem is that it can
be very difficult to tell why a particular fence has been constructed. 234
Here, we might view an interest in selling the entitlement as evidentiary on the question of intent. 235 Alienability restrictions could screen

231 Social norms, rather than legal prohibitions, seem to be doing the work in examples like this
one. Not only may people intuitively appreciate the strategic risks of paying a neighbor to stop
doing something, offering cash to one's neighbor to stop playing an instrument couples a direct
insult with the interjection of money into a setting where it is likely to seem inappropriate. As
this example suggests, de facto limits on alienability may already produce some ex ante selection
benefits.
232 To be sure, we could imagine variations on the entitlement regime, such as a "learner's permit" that allows the poor playing of a musical instrument to continue for only a certain period of
time before it becomes enjoinable. Such a regime would be administratively costly, however, and
would require difficult qualitative judgments.
233 See, e.g., Spite Fences, in 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 62.05, (Michael Allan Wolf

ed., 2oo8) (noting divided authority on the point, but suggesting that "[t]he trend of modern decisions appears to favor the view that a spite fence that serves no useful or beneficial purpose is
unlawful"); Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 234-35 (2002)
(noting the varying treatment of spite fences); Kelly, supra note 63, at 11-14.
234 See Farnsworth, supra note 233, at 235 (noting "the administrative cost of identifying true
spite fences and separating them from the look-alikes').
235 For an extended treatment of this idea in the blackmail context, see Berman, supra note 64.
The same evidentiary argument would explain the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act's
inclusion of an offer to sell a domain name among the factors relevant to the bad faith inquiry.
See Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 1,70 & n.477 (2005) (citing S. REP. NO. IO6-I4O, at 15 (1999)).
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out those building for strategic reasons, although they would offer no
relief against a truly spiteful fence-builder for whom seeing a neighbor
suffer is payment enough. Moreover, by blocking potential bargains,
such rules risk leaving in place inefficiently ugly but earnestly constructed fences.
A similar argument might be attempted with respect to the limits
on land use exactions contained in Nollan v. California Coastal Com2 37
mission 36 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.
These decisions reflect the
Court's anxiety about strategic acquisition (here, enactment of land use
regulations) for later resale to burdened landowners (lifting the regulation in exchange for a concession from the property owner). In this
context, substantive checks on acquisition seem superior to indirect attempts to influence acquisition incentives through alienability limits,
which could block efficient bargains.2 38 But suppose that, for whatever mix of normative reasons, courts do not wish to restrict the ability
of local governments to enact sincerely desired land use regulations.
Local governmental sincerity may be as difficult to detect as good faith
attempts at trombone playing. If so, and if land use regulations resold
to landowners for unrelated or disproportionate benefits are, on average, less sincerely desired than those that are not resold in that manner, then the bargaining restrictions might lead local governments to
2 39
enact a larger proportion of sincerely desired restrictions.
Of course, the argument falls apart if the forbidden bargains would
not disproportionately attract insincere lawmaking, or if one believes
that substantive criteria beyond sincerity should govern land use enactments. There are other reasons to be leery of these bargaining restrictions as well: ex post pressures make such alienability limits difficult to sustain, 240 and to the extent the limits are enforced, they
unfairly restrict the choice set of the would-be purchaser (the landowner) who had no hand in the government's ex ante decision to ac2 41
quire the entitlement.

236 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nollan requires an "essential nexus" between the purpose of the original restriction and the concession that the landowner provides in exchange for lifting it. Id. at
837.
237 512 U.S. 374 (994). Dolan requires "rough proportionality" between the landowner's concession and the harms that were addressed by the lifted land use regulation. Id. at 391.
238 See generally, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. i (2000); William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions:
A PropertyRights Analysis, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1987, at ioi.
239 For a discussion and critique of this argument, see, for example, Fischel, supra note 238, at
107-o8.

240 See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 1243, 1286-1302 (1997) (discussing circumvention of the Nollan and Dolan bargaining
limits).
241 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 238, at 4-5.
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3. Preserving Autonomy. - Limiting exclusion by downgrading
property rule protection to liability rule protection offers one response
to resource dilemmas, as we have seen. But liability rules carry some
well-known costs, including potential impacts on incentives and on expectations about property. Notably, they introduce valuation concerns
- the amount of compensation paid under the liability rule may be
deemed inadequate. 42 While it may be possible to address these concerns with techniques like self-assessed valuations, 243 these approaches
are sometimes disfavored for administrative or distributive reasons.
More fundamentally, liability rules deprive the entitlement holder
of a form of autonomy - control over the fact of the transfer.2 44 That
the entitlement can be removed without the entitlement holder's consent might seem independently objectionable in some settings, even if
the price paid is quite adequate. Of course, a complete ban on alienability would also deprive the owner of control over the fact of the
transfer (albeit in a different way) by forcing her to retain the entitlement forever.2 45 Yet it is possible to devise alienability limits that
leave the usual degree of choice about the fact of the transfer with the
entitlement holder,2 46 while specifying a set of limits that will apply
once the choice to transfer has been made. The content of these limits
may, in turn, induce self-selection by those who are unlikely to hold
out for strategic reasons. Alternatively, the limits may determine the
way that surplus will be assigned, which can forestall bargaining
breakdowns. To take a simple example, price caps would leave the
choice of whether to sell with the owner but would limit returns from

242 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note o8, at 2093 (discussing the risk of undercompensation associated with liability rules).
243 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L.
REV. 771 (1982); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L.
REV. 327, 364-73, 389, 392-93 (igg); Fennell, supra note 193. It would also be possible to use
alienability limits as part of a mechanism designed to elicit truthful valuations. See Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007) (combining self-assessed valuation for purposes of eminent domain compensation with restrictions on
selling below the self-assessed amount if the government chooses not to go forward with the taking); Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 232-36 (proposing an auction mechanism for allocating contested domain names followed by a two-year period of inalienability).
244 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 183, at 842; see also CHRISTMAN, supra note 183, at 167 (asso-

ciating liability rules with a lack of control and explaining that "control rights serve autonomy
interests").
245 See Morris, supra note 183, at 842.

246 By "usual degree of choice" I mean the "voluntary transfer" column in Figure 2, in which
the owner and the nonowner must both agree to the transfer. Put options, which permit an owner
to force a transfer, represent another alternative and will be discussed below. See infra section
III.C.I.
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any sale that does occur, influencing both who will become an owner
247
in the first place and the later course of bargaining.
Some alienability limits, such as holding periods or criteria that
buyers must meet, would operate to thin the market for the entitlement and make a transfer less likely. While this market thinning dilutes the owner's holdings and increases the chance that resources will
be locked up in inefficient uses, it arguably interferes with autonomy
less than does a forced or prohibited transfer.
C. Inalienability Without Anxiety
Refinements to inalienability rules can reduce, often dramatically,
the inefficiencies that would otherwise attend them. A couple of concrete ideas will help to flesh out some of the possibilities.
i. Adding Put Options. - Often, the costs of inalienability can be
greatly reduced by pairing a ban on sales or other transfers with a "put
option" that gives the entitlement holder the right to force a transfer of
the entitlement to a specified party at a preset price. 248 Ordinary
alienability requires the willing cooperation of a buyer 249 (or other recipient 250 ) and hence does not amount to an enforceable "right" against
another party.25 1 Put options amount to just such a right, and hence
may be attractive complements to limits on alienability.

247 For a discussion of the impact of price caps and similar restrictions on bargaining, see, for
example, EPSTEIN, supra note 203, at 5 7-58; Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 103-05.
248 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 183, at 854-56 (discussing put options). Put options may be
explicit, as in financial markets, or they may be embedded in background legal rules or contractual arrangements. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, go MINN. L. REV. 1664 (2oo6).
249 In relatively narrow circumstances, persons benefited by the actions of others can be required to compensate the actor. Such a legal rule would grant the actor an embedded put option.
Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, iiI YALE L.J. 547, 556-57, 602-03 (2oo1)
(explaining how a landowner's liability to the government for favorable governmental actions
would effectively grant the government a put option with a nonzero exercise price).
250 Even gifts require acceptance, although this element may be readily implied. See, e.g.,
Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 874-75 (N.Y. 1986) ("Acceptance by the donee is essential to the
validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a gift is of value to the donee, as it is here, the law will
presume an acceptance on his part."). Christman, however, uses the example of gifts to argue that
"alienation is unilateral" and distinguishes it from "exchange," which he describes as "a contingent
and conditional act." CHRISTMAN, supra note 183, at 129. Presumably, this analysis is based on
the fact that the overwhelming majority of donees do accept the gifts they are given, although the
law does not require them to do so. See also PENNER, supra note 187, at 80-87 (extrapolating
from abandonment to find a unilateral right to transfer property).
251 1 use the term "right" here in the Hohfeldian sense. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-36 (1913).
Others have made the same point. See, e.g., Rizzolli, supra note 2, at § 3.1 (noting that from a
Hohfeldian perspective, "under a property rule, the owner does not have the right to sell as there
is no corresponding duty of others to buy the entitlement"); see also HONOR9, supra note 5, at
I73 ("In deference to the view that the exercise of a right must depend on the choice of the holder,
I have refrained from calling transmissibility a right." (footnote omitted)).
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Of course, the right to abandon property, to the extent it exists,2 5 2
can be couched as a standing put option with a strike price of zero.
However, abandoned property may create large transaction costs.
Other actors must determine that the property is abandoned before
making a claim, during which time the property sits unused, or, worse,
deteriorates. Clear abandonment protocols can reduce these costs, but
only if erstwhile owners are willing to comply with the protocols.
That result is more likely if the costs of doing so are low or are reimbursed, or if entitlement holders have their own reasons for complying.
As to this last point, consider laws that offer new parents the option of
abandoning babies in designated places, such as fire stations, and thus
25 3
appeal to the parental desire to safeguard the child's well-being.
"Use or lose" provisions like those applicable to water rights, or the
"monitor or lose" rule associated with adverse possession, are closely
related to the ideas of structured abandonment and put options.25 4
Here, one relinquishes the entitlement and receives a "payment" in the
form of relief from monitoring or use in settings where those activities
have become costly on net.
To these "embedded put options," we might wish to add put options with positive prices, if alienability will be otherwise restricted. 255
In the case of domain names, for example, one concern is that the
stock of useful, attractive, and easy-to-remember words and phrases
will be depleted by the stockpiling or hoarding of names. 25 6 Although
an inalienability regime would remove the incentive to buy and hold
names for resale, 25 7 it could also take valuable names out of commission over time. In contrast, allowing holders who no longer need the
names to return them to the issuing agency and receive a fee would
provide a way of quickly reclaiming those names for use by others.
252 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 187, at 79-80 (discussing the owner's right to cede possession
but noting limits on that right, such as those attending the disposal of hazardous wastes); Strahilevitz, supra note 196 (examining the right to abandon and limits on it); cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2oo5) (examining the common law right to destroy
and limits on it).
253 See, e.g., Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act, 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2/1-2/70 (2006)
(establishing procedures for relinquishing newborn infants, and stating that relinquishment in accordance with the Act creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent consents to termination of
parental rights as to that infant).
254 See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 65o-6o, 681-83 (discussing "use it or lose it"
provisions and the inertia to which they respond).
255 Explicit put options may also be useful in reducing deadweight losses in settings where serious impediments to marketability exist. For example, consider the practice of offering a household going through foreclosure a lump sum if they leave the home behind in good condition. See
Michael M. Phillips, Buyers' Revenge: Trash the House After Foreclosure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
2o08, at Ai (discussing the "cash for keys" approach, in which homeowners are paid "hundreds or
even thousands of dollars to put their anger in escrow and leave quietly").
256 See Franklyn, supra note 199, at 1277-78.
257 See id. at 1275-77 (discussing the impacts of domain name alienability).
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Similarly, if normative considerations point toward making grandfathered fishing rights inalienable, the inefficiency of leaving rights
"out" with people who are no longer using them could be eliminated
2 58
with a buyback program.
Where a positive strike price is set for a put option, two potential
worries follow. First is the concern that wasteful acquisition will occur
just to exercise the option.25 9 This can be controlled by keeping the
exercise price equal to or lower than the present-value equivalent of
the cost of initial acquisition, or by requiring the entitlement to have
been owned for some period before the put option was announced (or
anticipated).2 60 Second, if inalienability is designed to serve intrinsic
ends by keeping an individual from parting with a particular entitlement, the put option would operate against that goal, although less
strongly than would the prospect of open-market sales. Hence, put options are likely to be most attractive where intrinsic considerations do
not dominate and where the costs of initial acquisition can be reliably
estimated.
It is important to emphasize how a put option differs from the "call
options" that are the stuff of ordinary liability rules. Unlike giving the
government or some other centralized body the power to take away
the entitlement for a price, the put option leaves control over the fact
of the transaction with the entitlement's owner.2 6 1 So long as the entitlement is valued for its use by its owner, it can be maintained for that
purpose without interference; the choice to force a sale lies with her,
not with the government. In some settings, this arrangement may be
normatively desirable.
2.
Specifying Transfer Protocols. - Another way to approach
alienability restrictions is by specifying particular transfer protocols
that must be followed in the event the owner chooses to alienate the
entitlement. The required use of sealed-bid second-price (or "Vickrey")

258 Cf L.S. PARSONS, MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES IN CANADA 191 (1993) (dis-

cussing the use of fishing license buyback programs to address overcapacity problems).
259 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common Sense Reply to ProfessorAyres, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 844 (1998) (discussing
the perverse incentive to pollute that would exist under a put option regime in which parties are
paid to stop polluting).
260 For example, some states and localities have begun experimenting with buybacks of environmentally harmful older cars, although careful design is necessary to make sure people do not
resurrect dinosaurs from junkyards just to claim the payment. See Alan S. Blinder, A Modest
Proposal: Eco-Friendly Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at c (explaining that a "Cash for
Clunkers" program might specify that "only vehicles that had been registered and driven for, say,
the past year would be eligible").
261 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 808 ("[U]nder a call option, the fate of the initial entitlement's
holder is decided by the other side, but under a put option, the initial entitlement holder decides
her own fate ....").
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auctions, 262 for example, would help to select against strategic acquisi-

tion of entitlements that are valuable only to a single identifiable party.
In this type of auction, bidders submit their valuations via sealed bids
and the highest bidder receives the entitlement - but at the price bid
by the second-highest bidder. 263 This setup is thought to induce bids
that reflect true valuations: a bidder who idiosyncratically values an
entitlement more than everyone else need not fear that she will end 2up
64
paying any portion of her extra, idiosyncratic increment of value.

While other types of auctions (including ordinary first-price auctions)
will produce the same expected revenue to the seller if certain assumptions hold, 265 second-price auctions place the highest valuer's extra inand certainty.266

crement of value off limits with greater transparency
A Vickrey auction makes strategic acquisition undertaken solely for
purposes of reselling to an identifiable high valuer clearly unprofitable,
while leaving intact the incentives that the rest of the market provides.
Consider how this approach might play out in the blackmail conof blackmail is why so-called
text. One of the abiding sub-puzzles
"market price" blackmail is illegal.2 67 In this type of blackmail, the information involved has a market value (say, to a tabloid), and hence its
procurement cannot be said to have been a total waste, at least if one
262 See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation,Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J.
FIN. 8, 20-21 (g6).
263 See id. at 20.
264 See id. at 20-21 (observing that, in the absence of collusion, "the optimal strategy for each
bidder ...will obviously be to make his bid equal to the full value of the article or contract to

himself" and explaining why higher or lower bids would not be rational). But see, e.g., John H.
Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of ExperimentalResearch, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL

EcONOMICS 501, 5o8-I1, 513 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (discussing experimental results showing bids above the "dominant strategy price" in second-price auctions, but finding
that a larger proportion of second-price than first-price sealed bids are within $.o5 of true valuations); Jack L. Knetsch et al., The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey
Auction Demand Revealing?, 4 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 257 (2OOl) (questioning, based on experiments with second- and ninth-price auctions, the demand-revealing properties of Vickrey auctions). For a discussion of second-price auctions and similar mechanisms, see, for example, Parchomovsky, supra note 47.
265 See Vickrey, supra note 262, at 28; see also McAfee & McMillan, supra note 22o, at 707-11
(discussing the "Revenue-Equivalence Theorem" and its dependence on certain "benchmark"
assumptions).
266 See Vickrey, supra note 262, at 28 (suggesting that switching to the "first-rejected-bid" pricing of a second-price auction could achieve gains from "the greater certainty of obtaining a
Pareto-optimal result and from the reduction in non-productive expenditure devoted to the sizingup of the market by the bidders"). Measures would be necessary to control the risk of false "second bids" by those colluding with the seller. See id. at 22 ("To prevent the use of a 'shill' to jack
the price up by putting in a late bid just under the top bid, it would probably be desirable to have
all bids delivered to and certified by a trustworthy holder, who would then deliver all bids simultaneously to the seller.').
267 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 64, at 857 (describing "market price blackmail" as "one of the
most complex riddles within the blackmail puzzle"); id. at 857-6o (discussing and citing literature
on this topic).
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equates willingness to pay with some social value.26s If we would find
nothing wrong with the sale of the information to the tabloid, why
should the person who stands to lose reputational capital by its release
not be able to bid against the tabloid? 269 Such a counterbid to suppress the information might seem little different in principle from the
Nature Conservancy bidding against developers to gain control of land
in order to protect it from use. One explanation for the prohibition on
market price blackmail might be simple administrative ease - it is too
difficult to tell when another bidder really exists or to determine that
bidder's valuation. 270 But there may also be efficiency concerns about
allowing the prospect of recovering from the blackmailee to drive decisions about information acquisition. In addition, there may be distributive concerns about allowing the blackmailer to claim a share of
the large surplus by which the blackmailee's valuation exceeds that of
the nearest market competitor.
These concerns could be addressed by requiring that damaging information about another person be alienated to that person only
through a second-price auction. The blackmailer would only be able
to get what the top-paying tabloid would be willing to pay, and the
blackmailee would have to pay no more than that amount, regardless of how high her valuation might be. Robert Nozick argues
for this economic result in discussing the suppression of marketable
information:
[A] seller of such silence could legitimately charge only for what he forgoes
by silence . .. So someone writing a book, whose research comes across

information about another person which would help sales if included in
the book, may charge another who desires that this information be kept
secret (including the person who is the subject of the information) for refraining from including the information in the book. He may charge an
amount of money equal to his expected difference in royalties between the
book containing this information and the book without it; he may not
charge the best price he could get from the purchaser of his silence. 271
A second-price auction offers a way of operationalizing this idea that
would sidestep some of the practical concerns scholars have raised
about it.272
268
269

See Hardin, supra note 1oi, at 18o6.
For a detailed argument that such blackmail fits within the framework of mutual advan-

tage, see id. at 1803-09.
270 See, e.g., Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, I4l U.
PA. L. REV 1663, 1675-77 (I993); Hardin, supra note tol, at I8o6.
271 NOZICK, supra note 62, at 85-86.
272 See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 270, at 1675-76. Some difficulties, such as the problem of defining what the parties are bidding on without giving away the information itself, would remain.
See, e.g., id.; Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV
2237, 2272-77 (1996). In addition, such an auction would only offer a workable solution in instances in which the information is fully controlled by a single blackmailer; otherwise, it would
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The domain name situation could be addressed similarly. A registrant acquiring "vw.net" 2 3 could offer it for sale, but only through a
second-price auction.2 7 4 The registrant would be unable to exercise
leverage against Volkswagen based on that company's idiosyncratically
high valuation. If Volkswagen were the high bidder, it would receive
the domain name, while the registrant would receive only the amount
(if any) that a second party was willing to bid. If there were no second
bid, the domain name would be transferred for free. Foreseeing this,
the registrant would not resort to the auction unless at least one other
party were interested in the name. This, in turn, would remove ex
ante incentives to acquire a name solely to exert leverage against a single party with an exceptionally high valuation.
Such an approach has its limits. It would work best in situations
where a single party values the good much more highly than does everyone else, and where few, if any, legitimate bargains would be
thwarted as a result of the rule. Often, these criteria are not met. For
example, a patent holder who has added a great deal of social value
might nonetheless have only one plausible buyer. Alternatively, a patent holder who has added little or no social value could wield monopoly power against many parties simultaneously. Coercive threats of
other sorts may also have broad audiences, as seen in the "Saving
Toby" scenario in which the owner of an adorable bunny posted an
internet threat to kill and eat the creature unless viewers sent in
$5o,ooo.215 Nonetheless, because some anxiously alienable goods have
features amenable to second-price auctions, applications of this protocol are worth considering in greater depth.
More generally, we might consider other kinds of transfer procedures capable of cutting through bargaining dilemmas without unduly
not be within the power of the blackmailer to "convey" the information to the high-bidding
blackmailee in a way that would truly take it off the market. I thank Stephanie Stern for this
point. Because the blackmailer's ability to deliver an "exclusive" to a tabloid is likely the source
of any significant market potential for the information in the first place, however, the second-price
solution could work well in many "market price blackmail" situations.
273 The domain name "vw.net" was at issue in Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 238 F.3 d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
274 Gideon Parchomovsky has also proposed using an auction mechanism to resolve disputes
over domain names. Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 229-40. Significantly, his proposal would
allow a trademark holder to force a domain name owner to participate in a process which could
involuntarily divest the owner of the entitlement (with compensation at the level bid by the
owner). Id. at 232-33. His proposal (which also differs from mine in a number of other respects)
thus represents a type of contingent liability rule in which control over the fact of the transfer itself depends on who turns out to be the high bidder.
The idea of using auctions to assign domain names in the first instance has also been explored. See Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name
Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 459-86 (2003).
275 See Stephen E. Sachs, Saving Toby: Extortion, Blackmail, and the Right To Destroy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251 (2oo6).
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blocking useful transactions. The basic idea is to leave control over
the transaction in the entitlement holder's hands while specifying surplus-dividing procedures that must apply in the event the entitlement
holder decides to make a transfer and a buyer decides to accept it.
Any set of nonnegotiable surplus-dividing rules will sidestep bargaining dilemmas, and distributive goals can be accommodated by adjusting the content of the rules. These points have been well-recognized in
the context of liability rules, which always specify a division of surplus. Indeed, the idea that jointly chosen transactions might occur at a
pre-stated price can be found embedded in the literature on new forms
of liability rules.' 7 6 But combining wholly voluntary transactions with
mandatory, impasse-averting procedures is a powerful and flexible
concept whose true roots lie not in the unilaterally imposed transactions of liability rules but rather in inalienability. Recognizing alienability as an alternative margin for adjusting property entitlements
clears a space for new innovations in overcoming strategic dilemmas.
D. Taking Stock
As should be evident by now, inalienability's role in resolving collective action problems is fundamentally interstitial. Whether inalienability rules offer the best chance for increasing surplus or achieving other goals in a given context is a comparative inquiry that turns
on the feasibility, efficacy, and normative desirability of other courses
of action, including doing nothing. The case for inalienability rules is
at its apex when a decision has already been made to intervene in
property entitlements in some manner and the other candidate interventions involve significant costs along one or more of the margins
identified above - administrability, information asymmetries, or
autonomy. Alienability limits deserve a fair hearing in such instances,
and giving them one requires recognizing the full range of potential
inalienability rules and the many ways in which they might be structured to minimize the disadvantages associated with blocking trades.
276 See Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2004) (describing "modular liability rules"); Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 192, at 9-1O, 34-37 (describing
"dual-chooser rules"). These authors introduce rules constructed from call and put options that
give both parties a say in whether a particular remedy will apply. Although consistently described as "liability rules," the resulting arrangements are the functional equivalent of granting
one party an entitlement that may be voluntarily transferred, subject to an alienability limit in the
form of a mandatory, nonnegotiable price. For example, the "defendant-presumption" variety of
"dual-chooser rule" specifies that the defendant receives the entitlement (say, to continue operating
her factory) unless both parties agree that it should be transferred to the plaintiff upon payment of
an amount specified by the court. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 192, at 34. A converse rule
would presumptively grant the entitlement to the plaintiff (say, to have the factory shut down) but
would specify that if both parties agree, the entitlement will be transferred to the defendant at the
preset damages price selected by the court. See Avraham, supra, at 297 (providing an example of
how a court's instructions to the parties might be formulated under such a rule).
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If we think that a heightened degree of openness to inalienability
rules could improve the flexibility and efficacy with which society addresses strategic dilemmas, how should that openness be operationalized? Here it is important to recognize that restrictions on alienability
may be sought by either public or private entities, may restrain either
public or private entities, and may serve purposes that fall anywhere
along the spectrum from fully private to fully public. The law must
decide when to enact and enforce public alienability limits, when to
enforce private alienability limits, and when to permit private parties
to act collectively to restrict alienability. This Article has not sharply
differentiated among these choices, much less argued for any particular
enactment, legal doctrine, or institutional arrangement. My focus has
instead been on the analytic case for making inalienability rules part of
the picture at all. Yet it is worth emphasizing that there are many different ways in which alienability limits might be implemented, all of
277
which offer avenues for future research.
CONCLUSION

Inalienability has been treated as a curiosity by property scholars, a
special topic imbued with exceptional normative content, hived off
from the rough and tumble of ordinary resource struggles. This Article has endeavored to reveal another side of inalienability. Like other
core property attributes, alienability represents a dimension that can
be adjusted to address tragedies of the commons and the anticommons. Because these resource dilemmas are ubiquitous, recognizing
inalienability's role in their resolution should bring this underappreciated property attribute out of the shadows. Perhaps most interestingly,
alienability adjustments offer a way to address monopoly power while
leaving exclusion rights, and the autonomy interests that they are often
thought to serve, fully intact.
To recognize this neglected side of inalienability is not, of course, to
suggest that such restrictions are always or even frequently superior to
limits on acquisition, use, or exclusion. Very often, other margins offer
better points of intervention, and even where they do not, nonintervention may be preferable to the inefficiencies that inevitably come from
blocking desired exchanges. Nonetheless, it seems likely that properly
formulated alienability limits could play an important role in some areas. Just as there are many imaginable variations on property rules

277 Again, the analogy to liability rules is instructive. In addition to examining liability rules as
mandatory legal rules, scholars have explored the potential of opt-in regimes featuring such rules.
See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV 1293 (1996).
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and liability rules, there are many ways that alienability might be altered to address resource tragedies - yet very few of the latter have
received explicit consideration by property scholars. Thus, I hope this
Article will open the door to more innovation in inalienability.
Equally important for property theory is the payoff of working
through the source and meaning of the anxiety surrounding certain
kinds of transfers. I have suggested here that this anxiety has its roots
not only in distributive concerns but also in worries about the inefficiencies that may follow strategic acquisitions for resale. Although a
typical approach to those worries is to dilute the strength of exclusion
rights and thereby allow transfers to occur more easily, an intriguing
alternative is to make transfers harder to accomplish. By illuminating
alienability's place in the constellation of property attributes, I hope to
counterbalance in some measure the current trend to view property,
and adjustments to it, solely in terms of exclusion. However fruitful
debates about the choice between property rules and liability rules
have been, it is time to make room in the discussion for inalienability
rules.
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